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This study investigated the premise that game rules can be used as 
instruments for teaching morality. Gowin's philosophic method of inquiry was 
utilized. It consists of the development of major hypotheses and their at-
tendent sub-hypotheses. Major hypotheses were developed concerning the concept 
of morality, the nature of moral rules, the essence of games, the nature of 
game rules, the relationship of moral rules to game rules, and the use of 
games as a vehicle for teaching morality. 
Concepts which emerged as a result of investigating the hypotheses sug­
gested that all cultures have games and systems of morality of which rules are 
an essential part. However, game rules and moral rules are not philosophically 
congruent in either the play domain or the real world. Evidence suggested 
instead, that moral rules are analogous to implicit game rules, that morality is 
analogous to the spirit of the game, and that official game rules are con­
gruent with real life laws. Although the official rules were not found to be 
the instruments through which games could be used to teach morality, games 
do contain moral elements in the form of implicit rules. It was therefore 
concluded that games could be instruments for teaching morality. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Cultural change is occurring at an accelerated pace. This change has 
been attributed principally to technology, which has had a profound impact on 
social organizations and on ideologies. (13, 28, 38, 41, 44, 54) The concept 
of rapid change has not been restricted to a single culture but has spread to 
encompass many cultures. Mass communication has been largely responsible for 
an increased awareness of interaction in the global community. 
In this milieu of rapid change, people, and particularly the young, have 
been challenging the belief and value systems of specific cultures, which are the 
rationale for the rules and laws which govern the conduct of people. It has 
been argued that cultural change today is too rapid to justify using rules of 
conduct and behavior which were applicable in more stable cultural configura­
tions. (28, 54) However, this argument does not necessarily imply that 
societies can exist without rules to govern conduct. Anthropologists and sociolo­
gists insist that cultures must have rules and norms to survive. Without rules, 
cultures, and particularly those cultures in dynamic flux, would spin into unstable 
conglomerations and eventually collapse. (17) 
Bombarded by ideas, unsettled by conflicting moralities, and confused by 
overchoice of products, most individuals in highly technological cultures need 
guidelines to organize their lives. (41) Toffler (41) suggested that whereas in­
dividuals in stagnant cultures have a psychological need for novelty and excite­
ment, in cultures characterized by accelerative change the need might be to 
preserve some continuities. He recommended that social strategies need to be 
developed and provided to support "change-harassed" individuals in such volatile 
cultures. 
Because of the development of these increasingly complex and mutable 
cultural patterns, rules of conduct are increasingly essential and necessary. If 
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existent rules are not appropriate for societies, then they need to be reap­
praised and possibly changed or even discarded. 
Traditionally, rules originated in cultures usually from an assimilation of 
many experiences; thus, age has taught youth. But, Margaret Mead has stated 
that ". . . today the elders can no longer present with certainty moral im­
peratives to the young." (28:82) The source of rules may be important, 
but the existence of rules would seem to be more important. If the tra­
ditional sources of rules and norms are diminished, the culture will and must 
find other ways of prescribing what constitutes appropriate conduct in any 
specific culture. Conceivably games might be one such source. 
Both games and cultures have rules, which have emerged as a result 
of many experiences by members of particular societies and by participants in 
particular games. Past experience, then, with a subsequent sifting out of 
meaningless experiences and the assimilation of meaningful experiences has been 
the usual pattern for establishing rules. Mead suggests this pattern is not 
viable in the prefigurative culture, a concept she advanced in her book Culture 
and Commitment. 
In the context of anthropological theory. Mead viewed culture as being 
of three kinds—postfigurative, cofigurative, and prefigurative. In the postfigurative 
culture, elders and the past are the principal source of learning. Such a 
culture is predicated upon the existence of three generations living together. The 
older generation is the guiding force. It is the beliefs and values of the elders, 
their expectations and hopes, which become ingrained into the young. External 
cultural patterns are not verbalized and remain at the nonconscious level. Lack 
of questioning and lack of consciousness keynote such a culture. This cultural 
pattern seems to fit Harding's (55) concept that in change there is no change. 
Only an anthropologist outside the system might observe the changes which had 
occurred. 
In the cofigurative culture, peers are the main source of learning for 
both adults and children. This is the "pioneer generation type" or "migration 
in space" in which the environment is new to adults as well as children. 
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Such a cofigurative culture appears when there is a break in the postfigurative 
culture of a catastrophic nature, such as migrating to a new land or being 
conquered and forced to adopt new ways of living. Comparisons can be made 
with the old environment. The awareness of difference offers the child a 
choice—the old way or the new way. The social structure of the family 
changes. Removal of the grandparents, in a physical sense, makes the past 
murky, and therefore it is easier to abandon the past. Since neither the past 
nor the future is clearly envisioned, behavior is regulated by peer groups. Mo­
bility and adaptability characterize such a culture. Other agencies take over 
many of the traditionally parental roles, but the children ". . . are being 
reared to an expectation of change within changelessness." (28:61) Peers be-
come more practical models than elders who are unable to serve this function. 
The prefigurative culture-which, Mead maintained, reflects our present 
period, is characterized by children being the prime source for learning. Such 
a culture is brought about by technological advances which create an environ­
ment in dynamic flux. Awareness of a world community has resulted, and 
Mead pinpointed World War II as the critical period which accentuated the 
generation gap. What makes this generation gap particularly unique is that 
youthful activism and revolt are occurring on a world-wide basis. Those born 
post-World War II live in an age—threatened by annihilation—which cannot be 
experienced emotionally by the older generation. Likewise, today's youth will 
never know the experiences of their pre-World War II elders. Mead employed 
the term "immigrants in time" to describe the pre-World War II or elder group. 
Mead has suggested that the war left its cultural mark with uncertainty and 
communication-breakdown keynoting this age. As a result of these difficulties 
and changes ". . . the elders can no longer present with certainty moral im­
peratives to the young." (28:82) Change is occurring with such rapidity that 
". . . the unborn child, already conceived but still in the womb, must become 
the symbol of what life will be like." (28:88) 
Societies need rules to govern the conduct of interacting individuals. 
Change, however, is forcing a re-evaluation of existent rules of conduct and the 
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source of such rules. Educators must find new ways of assisting individuals 
to cope with change, to understand the reason for rules of conduct, and to 
interpret and be guided by such rules. 
Premise. 
The premise of this study was that game rules can be used as in-
struments for teaching morality. 
Statement of the problem. 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the concept of morality, 
to analyze the relationship of moral rules to game rules, and to structure logical 
implications for the use of games to teach morality. Hypotheses and their 
attendant sub-hypotheses were developed. The tenability of the major and sup­
portive hypotheses was deduced from examination and analysis of the pertinent 
literature. The major hypothesis concerning morality was that all cultures have 
systems of morality. Sub-hypotheses were developed concerning the definition of 
morality, levels of moral judgment, morality reflecting culture, and the codification 
of the concept of morality. 
The second major hypothesis was that there are moral rules. The 
attendant sub-hypotheses were that moral rules are distinctive, have identifiable 
characteristics, can be classified, and serve societies. 
The third major hypothesis was that all cultures have games. Sub-
hypotheses included propositions that the play domain can be codified, that games 
can be defined, that there are levels of judgment in games, and that games 
reflect culture. 
The fourth major hypothesis was that there are game rules. Sub-
hypotheses included the considerations of game rules as being distinctive, having 
identifiable characteristics, being classifiable, and serving various functions. 
The fifth major hypothesis was that moral rules and game rules are 
philosophically congruent within their respective domains. Three sub-hypotheses 
were developed as follows: 1) a concept exists which is basic to moral rules 
and game rules; 2) moral rules are to morality what game rules are to games; 
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3) morality and the spirit of the game are comparable phenomena. 
The sixth and final major hypothesis was that games can be used to 
teach morality. Sub-hypotheses centered around the teaching of morality end 
the use of the spirit of the game as a vehicle for teaching morality. 
Method of approach. 
This study was approached utilizing Gowin's (105, 106) philosophic 
method of inquiry. Key concepts and their attendant assumptions and pre­
suppositions were developed concerning: 1) the nature of morality, 2) the 
nature of moral rules, 3) the nature of games, 4) the nature of game rules, 
5) the relationship of moral rules to game rules, 6) the use of games as 
a vehicle for teaching morality. In this manner, a conceptual system was de­
veloped. 
Definitions. 
For the purpose of this study, the definitions developed by Gowin 
(106) for philosophical inquiry were used. 
An assumption is "a statement of proposition upon which other state­
ments may depend. Something taken for granted, a supposition. Not tested, 
although it could be converted into a hypothesis for testing." (106:1) 
A presupposition is "an assumption made in advance, a necessary ante­
cedent condition in logic or fact." (106:1) 
A concept is "a sign of an invariance in a situation." Its root 
meaning is thought. "Conceptual studies concern ordinary language and its uses 
.  .  .  ,  and the  log ic  o f  in fo rmal  a rgument .  . . . "  (106:1)  
A conceptual system is "a set of concepts logically related." (106:1) 
Each key concept was developed as an hypothesis. Each hypothesis 
suggested questions which needed to be answered in order to verify the hypothe­
sis. The most pertinent questions were developed as sub-hypotheses. Answering 
the questions posed by the sub-hypotheses permitted the intelligible answering of 
the questions suggested by the hypothesis. Pertinent literature within each area 
was examined, analyzed, and interpreted by the author. Evidence was cited 
either supporting or refuting the sub-hypotheses. (105, 106) 
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CHAPTER II 
MORALITY 
Hypothesis. 
All cultures have systems of morality. 
Sub-Hypotheses. 
1. Morality can be defined. 
2. There are levels of moral judgment. 
3. Morality reflects culture 
4. Morality can be codified. 
Introduction. 
The concept of morality is obtuse and difficult to identify. Much of 
the difficulty in studying morality stems from its broad, multi-dimensional nature. 
The concept of morality has concerned scholars in many ways. It has been 
studied as an individual phenomenon, as a social phenomenon, as a cultural phe­
nomenon, as a systematic process based upon reason, and with views toward 
determining its essence. 
Frankena (15) synthesized the various approaches which have been taken 
in analyzing morality and suggested that it can be studied in three ways: 
1) descriptively, 2) normatively, 3) analytically. The descriptive, empirical, 
historical, or scientific method is used by anthropologists, sociologists, psycholo­
gists, and historians for the purpose of describing existent moral systems. The 
normative method is used for contemplating and asserting such concepts as right, 
good, and obligation. It is assumed that reasons can be given when a norma­
tive judgment is made. The analytical, critical, or meta-ethical method of in­
quiry excludes the former methods described. Attempts are made to answer 
logical, epistemological, or semantical questions, such as the following: What is 
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the meaning of justice? What constitutes morality? How can value judgments 
be justified? Morality, in spite of its complexity, can be analyzed and studied. 
Morality can be defined. 
Due to the vagueness of the concept of morality and to its multi­
dimensional nature, there has not been agreement on a single synonym or a 
single definition of the essence of morality. Frankena pointed out that moral 
philosophers are currently engaged in attempting ". . . to grasp the nature of 
morality itself, as compared with law, religion, or science." (52:2) 
Frankena (52) further discussed the recent positions taken with regard 
to identifying the nature of morality. Within each position, there are divergent 
views. One position characterizes morality in formal and individualistic terms. 
According to this position, an individual has a morality if he has principles, 
formulated through moral reasoning based upon full factual knowledge of the 
situations, which he holds as supreme and is willing to see others hold as 
supreme. These conditions are formal or structural in nature; the content of 
the principles does not matter. In other words, such principles are moral not 
because of their content or their acceptance by others but because they fulfill 
those formal conditions stated above. A second position characterizes morality 
in formal and social terms. This position builds into morality an element of 
trans-individuality, it characterizes morality in formal terms, as specified above, 
but adds an interpersonal claim to the formal features of characterization. The 
other characterization necessary to make a judgment moral is a claim that others 
will sustain the judgment when they take the moral point of view. The third 
position characterizes morality in material and social terms. The material con­
dition requires considering the concern of others and the common good. In 
this conception, morality, as a guide for human behavior, has certain formal 
conditions but by definition must include a material or social condition. Thus, 
moral reasoning is complete only if there is an appeal to a social goal or 
principle. It is not clear why Frankena did not characterize this latter position 
of morality in formal and material terms, as Baier (2) did. 
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l .  
Baier suggested that formal conditions alone can not characterize 
morality. The principles or rules should have a certain content. He defined 
that content as being . . for the good of everyone alike." (2:200) 
Morality can be characterized in formal and materialistic terms. 
It would seem that morality can not be defined solely in individual­
istic terms or in social-materialistic terms. Generally, regardless of the position 
taken, there is agreement that morality involves distinguishing between the 
Tightness and wrongness of certain actions. (2, 6, 15, 19, 26, 31, 32, 40, 
61, 59, 93) Morality is a system of guidance. But, it is a system which 
is not legislated. (2, 15, 19, 51) Morality is a concept wKibh can be in­
terpreted by an individual or by a group. However, the group's interpretation 
of morality is bound to affect the individual, because the individual is taught 
the morality of the group before he understands the reasons for it. Thus, 
morality can not be studied solely on an individual level or on a societal 
level without losing some of its meaning. 
Baier (2) established conditions under which the morality of a group is 
justified in prohibiting behavior. The conditions were the following: 1) The 
consequences of the behavior would be undesirable if everyone did it; 2) every­
one was equally entitled to engage in the behavior; 3) engaging in the behavior 
was an indulgence, not a sacrifice. If the three conditions existed, then, Baier 
maintained, the morality of the group should prohibit such behavior. 
Whether or not a group's interpretation of the concept of morality is 
the same as another group's interpretation does not seem to matter. What 
does matter is that some system for distinguishing between the Tightness and 
wrongness of certain actions exists within a society. Interacting individuals need 
guidelines to govern their actions. Morality provides such guidelines. Thus, the 
action-guidance within the province of morality seems to center around the 
individual's interaction with others, for example, truth-telling, impartiality, pro­
tection of goods. 
Analysis of the literature suggests that, although the definition of 
morality is obtuse and vague, it can be explained as a concept which dis­
tinguishes right conduct from wrong conduct. Thus, the sub-hypothesis that 
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morality can be defined is found tenable. 
There are levels of moral judgment. 
Philosophers, such as Falk (51) and Peters (64), made reference to 
levels of morality and moral judgment. Falk alluded to primary morality and 
mature morality. On the primary level, he defined morality". . as authori­
tative action guidance whose function is to regulate the social order." (51:63) 
On the mature level, morality is conceived as a reason-guided concept of ought-
ness which exists for the orderliness of the individual. Peters supported a 
rational moral code which was intelligently applied. He differentiated between 
acting "in accordance with a rule" and acting "on a rule." Acting in accord­
ance with a rule suggests obeying a directive for conduct. Acting on a rule 
suggests that the rule applies to a class of acts which encompass a wide range 
of actions all of which fall under the rule. Acting on a rule, according to 
Peters, requires intelligence and social sophistication. 
The research of Piaget (33), Kohlberg, (60, 108), and Hess, Minturn 
and Tapp (103) suggests that there are levels or stages of moral judgment and 
that these levels of development appear cross-culturally. From the research . 
findings, it appears that individuals move through three levels of moral judgment. 
Level one is preconventional or ego-centered. A judgment is motivated by a 
view of avoiding punishment by an authority. Level two is conventional or 
conformity to societal roles and rules. Actions are consistent with societal 
expectations. Level three is postconventional or reworking of societal rules. 
Appeals are made to universal principles. 
The emergent pattern of moral judgment development seems to be that 
initially the individual sees rules as absolutes to be followed to avoid punish­
ment. Then, it appears that the rules are seen in broader perspective. An 
understanding develops that they serve a social function. Finally, there develops 
an ability to generalize the rules, to understand the reasons for their existence, 
and to question and change them if necessary. 
Kohlberg (59, 82, 83, 108, 109), on the basis of his research, specifi­
cally delineated six stages of moral development. Within level one or the 
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pre-moral level, as Kohlberg described it, are stages one and two. Stage one 
judgments are motivated by punishment from and obedience to an authority 
orientation. Stage two Kohlberg called instrumental relativism. Judgments are 
motivated by attempting to fulfill quasi-physical needs. Within level two or 
the morality of conventional role-conformity are stages three and four. Stage 
three judgments are oriented towards receiving social approval while stage four 
judgments are oriented towards understanding the social order and one's role in 
it. Within level three or morality of self-accepted moral principles are stages 
five and six. Stage five moral judgments are based upon fulfilling social and 
legal contracts. Stage six morality is based upon the recognition of universal 
moral principles. 
Kohlberg found evidence that individuals progress from level to level. 
However, most individuals never advance beyond level two, which is conformity 
to societal roles and rules. Coopersmith's (8) study involving value preferences 
supports the pattern found by Kohlberg that individuals seldom advance beyond 
level two. Coopersmith found that individuals generally employ value preferences 
which conform to the social norms of one's group rather than to independently 
derived standards. Kohlberg also found that an individual is generally unable 
to comprehend judgments which are more than one stage higher than his own. 
Moral development, it appears, can be enhanced. (59, 60, 61, 108, 109) 
One hypothesis claims that if congruence can- be established between stages, then 
progress through stages would be facilitated. In support of this hypothesis, it 
was found that children with mothers at level three tended to progress to level 
three. Another hypothesis suggests, with research support, that individuals will 
prefer judgments on a higher level when disputes between stages occur and when 
the shortcomings of lower-level judgments are pointed out to those possessing 
them. 
Hampden-Turner and Whitten (77) took Kohlberg's model of sequential 
stages of moral development and applied it to the recent accentuation of 
political factions, i.e., conservatives, liberals, radicals, which had appeared in the 
United States. The model proved to be valid in explaining the views of those 
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within each group. For example, political conservatives referred to conformity 
to traditional roles (stage three) and to law and order (stage four) in making 
moral judgments. Radicals were divided between idealists whose judgments were 
based upon conscience and principles (stage six) and opportunists whose judg­
ments were egocentric (stage two). 
The acquisition of morality as a cognitive-developmental process which 
occurs within the individual is contrasted with a socialization theory which in­
volves internalizing culturally transmitted external rules through reinforcement 
procedures. It would appear that if social factors can enhance moral develop­
ment, then the developmentalists need to examine antecedent variables and 
cultural influences more closely. On the other hand, if the ultimate goal of 
morality is for the individual to participate in the moral argument of his time, 
as Brown (6) and Peters (64) suggested, then the proponents of the socialization 
approach to moral education need to examine ways which will not hinder 
fullest moral development. It would seem that the process of acquiring morality 
and of formulating moral judgments occurs in different ways and results in 
different levels of understanding. The sub-hypothesis that there are levels of 
moral judgment is found tenable. 
Morality reflects culture. 
Culture refers to the discernible way of life of a group of people who 
have learned to live together and who thus comprise a society. (37, 58) 
Basically, according to White (44), a culture has three dimensions as follows: 
1) ideology, 2) social organizations, 3) technology. These dimensions which 
are the discernible products of group interaction are interrelated and form the 
essence of culture. 
Morality is part of the belief and value system of a culture. The 
belief and value system of a culture is a group's attempt to establish a 
socially standardized idea about the universe and man's place in it. Commonly 
called a group's ideology, the belief and value system is the rationale and 
pervading spirit underlying the rules which govern the conduct of members of 
that group. 
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Cultural beliefs are assertions or concepts of what a group thinks is 
true. For example, the Bill of Rights espouses the belief system of the 
citizenry of the United States. However, evidence suggests that there is seldom 
a high positive correlation between stated beliefs and behavior. (6, 33, 61) 
Therefore, it is not unusual to find discrepancies between what people say they 
believe and what they do. To increase the correlation, Brown (6) stressed, is 
a lifetime task. Studying any phenomenon, such as morality, purely in theoretic 
cal as opposed to practical terms, or vice versa, is to lose some of its meaning 
Cultural values, according to Baier (47), are dispositions or attitudes for 
or against an activity or phenomenon which are manifested in behavior. The 
roots of such dispositions or attitudes stem from the belief that the realization 
of the goal to which the value points would benefit the individual, group, or 
society in some way. Baier suggested that values deal with the good life and 
ways of achieving it. The dominant value system of the middle class in the 
United States, according to DuBois, ". . . is rooted in the Protestant ethic 
and eighteenth century rationalism." (73:1232) ̂  
In the United States, morality is more individualistically oriented than in 
most other cultures. (15, 75) According to Gillin (75), "inner-regulated 
morality" is believed to be a virtue of the American value system. Generally, 
each individual is thought to have a conscience resulting in guilt feelings for 
wrong doings. Individuals are encouraged to use reason in formulating moral 
judgments and to develop a kind of autonomy which calls for decision - making 
on one's own to the extent of criticizing societal rules when necessary. 
As Brown (6) pointed out, there are a number of values, such as 
aesthetic, economic, and moral, all of which affect the various institutions and 
systems which are developed within a culture. Environmental conditions affect 
the realization of all values. For example, a drought or a war affects values. 
Moral values with the emergent moral system or code are no exception. They, 
too, are affected by existing conditions. The moral code developed by a group. 
1for other discussions of values see Gillin (75) and Rescher (65). 
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though distinctly serving a particular societal function, is interrelated with and 
influenced by other values and systems, which in turn are affected by existing 
conditions. These interdependent systems comprise the belief and value system 
of a culture of which the moral system is a part. 
Thus, due to differing environmental conditions, as well as historical 
conditions, as the Durants (11) pointed out, systems of morality differ. To 
illustrate this point, the Durants suggested dividing economic history into three 
stages: 1) hunting, 2) agriculture, 3) industry. Logically, they argued, 
the moral code, which existed during the hunting stage when man had to 
fight and kill to survive, changed during the agricultural stage when man could 
plan his subsistence, and is rapidly changing during the industrial stage when 
technological discoveries are extending man's horizons. 
Brown suggested that moralities ". . . change because of internal con­
tradictions, because of the impact of foreign moralities, and because of the 
creation of new circumstances." (6:411) As long as conditions differ from 
culture to culture, systems of morality will differ. The sub-hypothesis that 
morality reflects culture is found tenable. 
Morality can be codified. 
Societies could not exist without a system for determining right conduct 
from wrong conduct. All cultures have been found to have general moral 
principles or standards upon which rules permitting or forbidding certain actions, 
such as truth-telling and incest, are based. The recognition of moral concepts 
and the development of moral rules allows for the stability and continuance of 
groups and maximizes the individual's security within the group. (63, 80) 
Individuals within a society need guidelines to govern their behavior in 
relationship to one another. As a result of sharing a common belief and 
value system, the group interprets the concept of morality. The codifications 
of this concept are moral rules. Thus, moral rules guide behavior towards 
societally acceptable patterns of conduct. Traditionally, these rules or guide­
lines have developed through the experiences and wisdom of generations. (47, gi) 
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As morality is codified, a system or code evolves. 
Since moral rules serve to assure security and foster confidence for 
members of the society, adherence to them is expected. In his analysis of 
values, Baier (47) distinguished a sub-class of values which he called "distribu­
tive." Distributive values, he suggested, are important to maintain the practice 
of morals. Distributive values, if maintained by an individual within a group, 
are believed to benefit the entire group. Moral rules serve society in such a 
way. Society demands compliance to moral rules because such compliance on 
the part of individuals benefits the group. Favorable attitudes are directed 
towards those members of the group who comply to moral rules, while un­
favorable attitudes are directed towards those who do not comply. Baier (47) 
argued that societal pressure to conform to moral rules gives rise to psychologi­
cal pressure within the individual to conform to moral rules. Related to 
Festinger's (14) theory of cognitive dissonance, group pressure induces guilt feel­
ings or dissonance within the wrong-doer. To alleviate these feelings, the indi­
vidual resolves the conflict by following what the moral rule advises. The 
dissonance is replaced by consonance, a state of equilibrium. 
Durant summarized, "Morals are the rules by which a society exhorts 
(as laws are the rules by which it seeks to compel) its members and associa­
tions to behavior consistent with its order, security, and growth." (11:37) 
Thus, in their origins, functions, and sanctions moral rules are social in nature. 
The sub-hypothesis that morality can be codified is found tenable. 
Summary. 
Analysis of the pertinent literature led to the support and acceptance 
of the four sub-hypotheses as follows: 
1. Morality can be defined. 
2. There are levels of moral judgment. 
3. Morality reflects culture. 
4. Morality can be codified. 
As a result of the evidence in support of the sub-hypotheses, the major hypo­
thesis that all cultures have systems of morality is accepted as tenable. 
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CHAPTER III 
MORAL RULES 
Hypothesis. 
There are moral rules. 
Sub-hypotheses. 
1. Moral rules are distinctive. 
2. Moral rules have identifiable characteristics. 
3. Moral rules can be classified. 
4. Moral rules serve societies. 
Introduction. 
Societies can not exist without rules. Rules are necessary to govern 
conduct. They save time and effort since it is not feasible to judge each 
situation anew. (2, 15, 91) Inherent in all social situations are circumstances 
which can be generalized. Rather than dealing separately with each situation 
which arises, societies classify interpretations of similar situations. Rules are 
developed to guide actions in situations which occur with similar circumstances. 
Thus, to refer to a rule is to follow a guideline which was found helpful in 
dealing with similar situations. Moral judgments which find their reference in 
moral rules are not purely particular but instead are implicitly general. 
The process of moral education depends, in part, upon the existence 
of rules. It is necessary to relate to a rule if any previous occurrence is 
to be related to the present. Without acknowledgment of a rule, there is no 
point of reference for conduct since each incident must find its rationale the 
moment it occurs. If there were no rules of conduct, there could be no 
transmitting of knowledge from one - situation to another or from one generation 
to another. (15, 32) Rules are society's conscience codified. 
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Since societies must have rules to exist and survive and since, as has 
been established in Chapter II, all cultures have systems of morality, moral 
rules would seem irrefutable realities. Morality is a concept which distinguishes 
right conduct from wrong conduct. Moral rules are society's codification of 
that concept. Those rules which guide behavior towards acceptable patterns of 
conduct, then, are moral rules. 
Mora/ rules are distinctive. 
The word "rule" connotes different meanings and feelings. Black (4) 
suggested that "rules" can denote a flavor of regulation, of instruction, of 
advice, and of exhortation. He identified and classified rules into four cate­
gories and used synonyms to describe the sense of each category, as follows: 
(1) Regulation (2) Instruction (3) Precept or maxim (4) Principle or 
general truth. 
Rules, when viewed as regulation, have histories and authors and also 
make references to time. In the category of regulation, Black put laws, ordi­
nances, and the expected conduct for playing games. 
Instruction rules have neither authors nor histories. They express some 
alleged means for achieving a purpose. Such rules are not put into effect, 
enforced, broken, rescinded, changed. Rules, in the instruction sense, can be 
said to be effective or ineffective, supported or unsupported by experience, use­
ful or useless. An illustration of an instruction rule might be: In determin­
ing the form of address in greeting someone, consider your relationship to him 
and his status. 
In the category of precept or maxim are rules of prudence and 
morality. Black explained that a person who states a precept or maxim rule 
gives advice and exerts influence. The individual receiving the advice can not 
lay the rule aside. Although the advisee may not want to follow the moral 
rule, he feels obligated to do what the moral rule advises. An example of 
such a rule is: Put charity before justice. (4:111) 
Principle or general truth is the fourth category of the word "rule," 
which Black described. Such a rule does not identify a class of human 
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actions, as the previous senses of rule do; nor does it involve forbidding, 
requiring, or permitting something, as the others do. Rather, principle or 
general truth rules have truth values ("true" or "false") ascribed to them. 
Black suggested that, "Years like 1952 that are divisible by four are leap 
years," exemplifies such a rule. (4:113) This fourth category of rule seems 
to involve statements of fact. 
Baier (2) distinguished six senses of the word "rule." He categorized 
rules into regulations, mores, maxims and principles, canons, regularities, and 
rules of procedure. He did not attempt to fit moral rules into one of his 
classifications. Whereas, moral rules concerning a society fall under Black's 
category of precept or maxim, Baier regarded rules in the sense of maxims 
and principles as being rules of an individual, not of a society. Baier indicated 
that only those tenets of conduct suggested by regulation and mores were 
social rules. 
Regulations differ from mores in a number of dimensions, according to 
Baier. Regulations come into being through a system of formulation and 
adoption; mores through a process of customs which gain general social support. 
Regulations are changed by deliberate action invested in a duly authorized person 
or body; mores by new and different types of conduct being supported. Regu­
lations are abrogated; mores cease existing by lack of support. Regulations are 
sanctioned in a highly organized, determinate manner, while relatively unorganized, 
indeterminate pressures are used to support mores. The speed limit is sixty 
miles per hour illustrates a regulation in Baier's classification of rules. Rules 
for good manners such as, one ought to shake hands when introduced to 
someone, fit the mores category, according to Baier. A moral rule such as, 
one ought to be honest, obviously fits Baier's mores category of rule concept 
rather than his regulation category. 
It would not be accurate to suggest that Baier meant for moral rules 
to fit into the mores category. Baier did not fit moral rules into one of 
his rule categories because he believed moral rules are distinct from other rules. 
Baier argued that moral rules must be subjected to certain tests. His contention 
18 
was that moral rules can not be regarded as sacrosanct or unalterable. Moral 
convictions expressed in moral rules can be true or false, according to Baier; 
therefore, it must be possible for such rules to be altered and improved by 
examining their validity in light of other possible, improved rules based on 
social ideals. Then, according to Baier, a group has a morality or moral 
code rather than a set of taboos. 
Rawls (91) distinguished between a summary conception of rules and 
a practice conception of rules. He suggested that moral philosophers tended 
to look at all rules using the summary conception. By summary conception, 
he was referring to rules as generalizations and guides. Such rules are formu­
lated by applying the utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number to particular cases. The utilitarian principle suggests that through 
the experience of generations, certain rules or generalizations have developed to 
govern specific situations so as to provide the most benefits for the largest 
majority. Thus, in the summary conception sense, rules are classified as maxima 
and "rules of thumb." According to Rawls, most moral rules are of a 
summary conception. However, he cautioned that some moral rules suggest 
practices. For example, moral rules dealing with punishment and promise-keeping 
suggest that such practices exist. Thus, they do not fit the summary con­
ception premise which is based upon establishing generalizations rather than de­
fining practices. 
Rawls differentiated between a summary conception of rules and a 
practice conception of rules. His distinction of rules of practice will be ex­
plained in Chapter V. 
From the literature studied, four concepts pertaining to the distinctiveness 
of moral rules have been identified as follows: 
1. Moral rules carry advice. 
2. Moral rules guide behavior. 
3. Moral rules are generalizations or "rules of thumb." 
4. Moral rules are social. 
These four concepts form a system against which a particular rule can be 
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compared to determine whether or not the rule is a moral rule. Rules which 
conform to the four concepts cited can be considered moral rules. Some rules 
may conform to some of the concepts, but this conformity does not qualify 
the rule as a moral rule. Moral rules can be distinguished from other rules 
only in so far as they fit all of the tenets of description; therefore, the sub-
hypothesis that moral rules are distinctive is tenable. 
Moral rules have identifiable characteristics. 
Moral philosophers in discussing moral rules have alluded to certain 
characteristics which moral rules possess. Those characteristics have been analyzed 
and synthesized and have yielded eight identifiable characteristics. 
1) Moral rules are not exactly defined. Black (4) defined moral rules 
as less circumscribed, less concrete than other rules. Singer alluded to the 
"indefiniteness," "vagueness," and "ambiguity" of moral rules. (40:133) Rees 
regarded them as "concealed conditional statements." (93:27) Hart referred to 
their "considerable area of 'vagueness' or 'open texture/" (19:164) 
The concepts with which moral rules deal include deceit, lying, grate­
fulness, promise-keeping. All these concepts have an air of vagueness and in­
definiteness. As a result of such ambiguity, there is a degree of latitude for 
individuals to affix different meanings to the words and the concepts they 
suggest. Since moral concepts are indefinite, teaching the meaning of such con­
cepts is varied, resulting in diffusion of meaning. 
Due to the indefiniteness of moral rules, moral philosophers disagree 
with each other on which rules should be called moral rules. When there is 
agreement that the rules are moral in nature, there is often disagreement as to 
each rule's status within the hierarchy of value with which it is associated. 
(19) 
The vagueness or indefiniteness of moral rules is further complicated by 
allowable exceptions. One ought not lie, but white lies are sometimes ac­
ceptable. One ought not cause physical harm to another, but self-defense is 
allowable. In addition to these allowable exceptions, the complexity of a 
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particular situation sometimes makes it difficult to identify when a rule is 
applicable and the extent of its application; i.e., my working partner has 
become emotionally upset and asks for my help; my wife is home sick and 
needs me. 
The general process of rule-formulation, as presented by Black (4), 
indicates the many variables with which rules in general and moral rules in 
particular are involved. His general pattern for rule-formulation suggested that 
rules be addressed to certain persons, doing or being forbidden to do certain 
actions in certain circumstances. It is the task of the discerner to identify 
the relevant aspects of any situation in order to determine which rule is 
applicable to the particular circumstance. The task is further complicated by 
the vagueness, ambiguity, and indefiniteness of moral concepts. 
2) Moral rules contain ethical terms. (2, 15, 26, 31, 32, 51, 56, 
59, 93) "Ought-ought not," "right-wrong," "should-should not" are ethical 
terms. Ethical terms are not neutral; they infer judgments about some action*. 
Since moral rules contain ethical terms, such rules, as Singer (40) suggested, 
permit, require, or prohibit certain actions. 
The particular ethical terms or expressions used in formulating moral 
rules are not important. (2, 67) For example, lying is wrong. (67) "Tell 
the truth." (26:32) What is important is the guideline for or against an 
action. Killing is wrong; one ought not to kill; thou shalt not kill; all make 
the same claim though different ethical terms are used. (2) According to 
Baier, "What counts is not the expression used, but the point made." (2:172) 
From the examples cited, it is apparent that the structural form which moral 
rules take is not particularly important. Moral rules can be stated any number 
of ways. Regardless of the particular terms employed, moral rules are action-
guiding and therein lies their essence. 
3) Moral rules are social in nature. (2, 15, 19, 26, 40, 67) Moral 
rules are societal guidelines governing the interacting conduct of individuals in 
that society. Their origins, functions, and sanctions are all structured by the 
group. 
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It is the social nature of moral rules which sets them apart from 
rules of prudence. Rules of prudence involve self-interest. They are rules 
which govern one individual's relations to others. The individual formulates 
his own rules of prudence to guide his behavior towards others. Such a rule 
might be, I won't smoke around people who consider smoking distasteful. 
Moral rules are formulated to achieve continuity and establish grounds of com­
monality for living in a particular society. They are formulated by the 
society and are imposed on individuals. Naturally, there will be times when 
an individual's self-interests will have to be sacrificed. That is a price one 
pays for living in a society. Therefore, as Baier (2) argued, without society 
there would be no need to have moral rules for distinguishing between right 
conduct and wrong conduct. 
4) Moral rules are not legislated. (2, 15, 19, 51) No formal or­
ganizations establish the moral code of a society. There are no publications 
or announcements which give notice of a moral rule going into effect. There 
is no magistrate, judge, or board of directors which is authorized to lay down 
moral rules. It is obvious, for example, that the rule, one ought not to lie, 
has not been legislated. Moral rules are not formal or arbitrary. 
But, if moral rules are not legislated, how do they come into effect? 
Hart suggested that moral rules may be completely customary in origin. Ross, 
(36) for example, wrote of the existent body of moral convictions, or moral 
rules, being the cumulative product of the best people reflecting on moral 
questions over a period of many generations. 
Baier theorized on the origin of morality as "... a comparatively 
sophisticated system of rules, ..." (2:180) He suggested that at some 
point in time, societies come to a faint realization ". . . that the group's 
way of life is not altogether sacrosanct." (2:180) Methods are developed by 
the group to deliberately control social change rather than to have change 
occurring without forethought or control. At approximately this stage, according 
to Baier, morality developed out of taboo, religion superseded magic, and law 
grew out of custom. Moral rules are not legislated, and as such, their origins 
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are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to trace. 
5) Moral rules impose obligations. (4, 33, 51, 56) Not all rules do 
so, as Black's "principle" category demonstrates, i.e. "Cyclones rotate clockwise, 
anticyclones anticlockwise." (4:113) But, if an individual is said to be under 
obligation, the existence of a rule is implied. "Oughtness," "rightness," and 
"wrongness" are words which imply obligation and duty. Moral rules, by recom­
mending or condemning certain actions, impose obligations and suggest duties 
which ought or ought not to be performed. 
Hart (19) suggested that the primary factor in determining whether or 
not a rule gives rise to obligations is the amount of social pressure exerted by 
a group towards compliance to the rule. When a rule is considered essential 
to the maintenance of social life, it is supported by serious social pressure. 
Rules prohibiting the unconditional use of violence are an example. Gradations 
away from the obvious, for example, rules for punctiliousness and rules for­
bidding deceit, likewise are enforced by social pressure, but to a lesser extent. 
Therefore, they impose lesser obligations. 
According to Baier (47), a group is justified in assuring compliance to 
obligations imposed by moral rules. When an individual violates a moral rule, 
harm is done to someone. When an individual complies with the obligations 
imposed by a moral rule, the entire group is believed to benefit. Compliance 
doesn't counterbalance a violation; compliance outweighs the effect of a viola­
tion because of the benefits derived by the group. 
Since obligations are imposed on individuals through societal enforcement, 
sacrifice or renunciation on the part of individuals can occur. It is not un­
usual for obligations imposed by social rules to conflict with the self-interest 
of individuals. 
6) Moral rules can be violated. (19, 51, 67) According to Durk-
heim, moral rules ". . . prescribe certain manners cf acting. . . (12:36) 
Embedded in the idea of prescribing certain actions is the idea that certain 
alternative actions are forbidden. Within any class of actions, there are a 
number of choices, but a moral rule prescribes the legitimate alternatives. When 
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an individual acts in a way which is not in accordance with a moral rule, he 
has violated or broken the rule even though the action may be justifiable. 
As Hart (56) suggested, the normative vocabulary of morality suggests 
that there are actions which deviate from the prescribed pattern of actions. 
"Ought" suggests "ought not"; "right" suggests "wrong"; "should" suggests 
"should not." This vocabulary draws attention to a standard and to deviations 
from that standard. Thus, the vocabulary used to structure moral rules indi­
cates that a possibility for action which violates the moral rule exists. 
7) The violation of a moral rule requires justification. (2, 4, 26, 64, 
67) Moral rules are important for the survival of a society. Since life within 
a society is more secure with rules, they are used. This function defends 
their existence. If the importance of the moral rule diminishes, with it goes 
its use and its defense for being a moral rule. A moral rule's use is its 
defense. Because moral rules are defendable, their violation requires justification. 
Many authorities agree that morality should be based on reasons. (2, 
6, 31, 32, 33, 40, 51) Society establishes moral rules to guide its members' 
behavior; it therefore follows that violating such rules requires explanation and 
reasonable rationale. So, when an individual breaks a moral rule, he must stand 
ready to give reasons for his actions. 
Times arise when strict adherence to a rule is not the best course of 
action. If an individual tells a lie, he has violated the moral rule, one ought 
to be honest; but if he lied to save someone from bodily harm, then he 
might be justified in having broken the rule pertaining to honesty. His action 
is not considered wrong if the moral reasons given for violating the moral rule 
outweigh the moral reasons for following it. Moral rules tend to have a 
hierarchy. 
8) Moral rules do not have physical sanctions. (2, 15, 19, 51) 
Since moral rules are not legislated, it follows that there is no defined, authorized 
system of enforcement or punishment. The sanctions imposed for breaches of 
such rules are not physical force or the threat of it. In other words, the 
sanctions have not been institutionalized as they have with lawbreaking. 
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Instead, the sanctions take the form of social pressure exerted verbally 
or nonverbally. (2, 4, 15, 51) Moral persuasion takes the form of smiles 
or frowns, acceptance or rejection, praise or blame. Appeals are made to 
respect the moral rule because the rule is considered important to the welfare 
of members of the society. (19) 
Moral philosophers frequently make reference to moral rules. Some 
moral philosophers have described moral rules. Others have suggested or 
alluded to qualities which moral rules possess. Eight general characteristics of 
moral rules have been identified, thus enabling the sub-hypothesis to be found 
tenable. 
1. Moral rules are not exactly defined. 
2. Moral rules contain ethical terms. 
3. Moral rules are social in nature. 
4. Moral rules are not legislated. 
5. Moral rules impose obligations. 
6. Moral rules can be violated. 
7. The violation of a moral rule requires justification. 
8. Moral rules do not have physical sanctions. 
Moral rules can be classified. 
Peters (64) supported a rational moral code within which he defined 
1) procedural rules, 2) basic rules, and 3) more-relative rules. Procedural 
rules would be based on higher-order principles, or principles that were more 
rationally justifiable and/or fundamental than others. Impartiality, liberty, and 
truth-telling exemplify higher-order principles, according to Peters. Such principles 
would allow the intelligent application of rules in light of relevant differences 
in circumstances. Also higher-order principles would permit revision of rules 
when changing circumstances and changing empirical knowledge regarding conditions 
and consequences were brought to light. Procedural rules would presuppose 
rational justification for such rules in practical discourse. 
Basic rules would involve general rules which bind members of a 
society together. Such rules would be justified under any social conditions for 
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they would be considered essential to the existence of the society. Peters 
regarded rules about contract-keeping as basic. Exceptions to basic rules could 
be made rationally on the basis of procedural rules. 
More-relative rules, Peters suggested, would depend on facts about par­
ticular social, economic, and geographical conditions for their justifiability. These 
rules would rely upon specific circumstances. 
During a period of rapid change, according to Peters, a minimal number 
of basic rules along with procedural rules should be taught. Peters did not 
specifically indicate which basic rules might be considered essential enough to 
teach. More-relative rules would not be taught, but ways of appealing to 
procedural rules in decision-making on more-relative matters would be taught. 
Singer (67) distinguished three classifications of moral rules as follows: 
fundamental rules, local rules, and neutral norms. Fundamental rules are, as 
the name implies, basic rules. They do not vary according to circumstances 
nor do they depend upon circumstances for their validity. They exist without 
regard to time and circumstance. 
Local rules depend upon local conditions. Varying standards, customs, 
and traditions, which are peculiar to different groups, influence the development 
of such rules, and circumstances affect them. Singer cited some examples of 
local rules. One ought to pay taxes is applicable only where governments 
establish a tax system; standards of fair competition vary for different businesses; 
a particular ethical code applies only to those people in the particular profession. 
Neutral norms are rules which, if their opposites were adopted, would 
make no moral difference. They are conventional in nature. Singer used as 
an example of a neutral norm the law requiring drivers to stay on the right 
side of the road. 
Mabbott (26) suggested that moral rules differ to the extent that tome 
moral rules are constitutive while others are regulative. Some constitutive moral 
rules are essential to the survival of any civilized society. Rules against killing 
and breaking promises are, according to Mabbott, this type. Other constitutive 
rules are essential to the existence of a particular institution within the society. 
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As an example he suggested rules for parental responsibility. Abolishing the 
rules making parents responsible for their children would mean a complete 
change in the family institution. Possibly, Mabbott suggested, the change 
might be to Plato's Republic scheme in which the government would assume 
the responsibility for infants. 
Regulative rules, Mabbott contended, have alternatives and are alterable 
without destroying or changing the basic nature of a society. A rule changing 
the age at which children are no longer the responsibility of their parents 
would not destroy a society or completely change the family institution. In 
fact, Mabbott suggested that altering such regulative rules is legitimate and some­
times necessary. He based the validity for the change upon a consideration 
of the consequences. 
Some philosophers, such as Baier (2), Kohlberg (82), and Singer (67), 
differentiated moral rules from moral principles. A principle is a fundamental 
truth and serves as a basis for developing more specific directives for conduct, 
hence rules. Thus, moral principles are more general than moral rules, but 
can be viewed as a classification of moral rules. When a differentiation is 
made between moral rules and moral principles, moral rules can be classified 
as specific moral directives and moral principles as moral concepts. Essentially, 
the meaning underlying moral principles coincides with Peter's procedural rule 
classification. 
Three classifications of moral rules have emerged as follows: 
1. Some moral rules are not affected by time or circumstances. 
Moral rules in this classification are, in effect, moral concepts. 
2. Some moral rules are necessary to the existence and survival of 
societies. Moral rules in this classification are, in effect, societies' 
practical guidelines derived from moral concepts. 
3. Some moral rules are specific in nature. Moral rules in this 
classification are affected by conditions and circumstances and as 
such are applicable only to certain situations. 
The sub-hypothesis that moral rules can be classified is found tenable. 
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Moral rules serve societies. 
A society is a group of interacting individuals who share certain 
grounds of commonality and who are united by the acceptance of certain rules. 
One of society's roles is to provide established patterns of behavior within which 
its members can live in confidence and security. (2, 26) 
There are cultural activities or practices, such as rituals and magic, 
through which a society exerts pressure to regulate human behavior. Usually, 
such cultural activities serve a latent function, as described by Turner. (69) 
Latent function suggests that cultural activities exert subtle influences upon mem­
bers of a society but that they are seldom thought by the memberi to serve 
a social function. Nevertheless, such activities are related to the belief and 
value system of the culture. The behavior observable in activities indicates 
what the group members believe to be of value to them. Their values are 
discernible in their behavior. (34) In effect, cultural practices serve to regu­
late human behavior. For example, the Ndembu circumcision ritual, through 
Turner's analysis, exposed the system of values underlying the Ndembu culture. 
In the American culture, spilling salt is associated with bad luck; a ritual has 
developed with the hope that the bad luck will not occur. 
Moral rules serve a latent function. They distinguish between right 
and wrong conduct and guide behavior towards established societal patterns. 
Moral rules deal with a distinct class of actions, those involving "rightness" and 
"oughtness," yet the function they serve is basically . the same as other devices 
which a society uses to regulate its members' behavior. Moral rules, as well 
as cultural activities, function as a glue for society even when this function 
may not be at the group members' level of consciousness. The cohesive function 
of moral rules, though it exists, need not be recognized by societal members. 
What is essential is that members recognize the function of moral rules as 
guidelines for distinguishing right conduct and wrong conduct. According to 
Piaget (33), the essence of morality is found in the degree of respect each individual 
develops for moral rules. 
A society depends upon threads of commonality to exist. Vital to 
any group are recognized standards addressed to the rightness and wrongness of 
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particular actions. Moral rules distinguish socially approved patterns of Tightness 
from socially disapproved patterns. As such, moral rules contribute a vital, 
distinguishable thread for strengthening a society and thus are of use to 
societies. The sub-hypothesis that moral rules serve societies is found tenable. 
Summary. 
Investigation of the pertinent literature led to the support and acceptance 
of the four sub-hypotheses as follows: 
1. Moral rules are distinctive. 
2. Moral rules have identifiable characteristics. 
3. Moral rules can be classified. 
4. Moral rules serve societies. 
As a result of the evidence in support of the sub-hypotheses, the major hypothe­
sis that there are moral rules is accepted as tenable. 
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CHAPTER IV 
GAMES 
Hypothesis. 
All cultures have games. 
Sub-hypotheses. 
1. The play domain can be codified. 
2. Games can be defined. 
3. There are levels of judgment in games. 
4. Games reflect culture. 
Introduction. 
Games are a part of the play domain, which consists of play-like 
movement, games, and sport. Play is a behavioral pattern sponsored by an 
attitude of fantasy, frivolity, and freedom. Its scope is universal. (24, 63, 
83, 88, 97) No externally imposed rules exist in play. The only rules 
play knows are those of the individual's concoction. 
When rules are imposed by outside forces upon the individual, play 
becomes games. Game rules are societal codifications of play rituals. Caillois 
(7) classified games into four groups: agon or games of competition, afea or 
games of chance, mimicry or games of pretense, and i/inx or games of vertigo. 
Sport encompasses only a part of the broad spectrum of game*. 
Agonistic games and sport are almost synonymous in that the concept of com­
petition underlies both of them. However, bridge, an agonistic game, is not 
a sport, while skiing, an ilinxic game, is a sport. 
The play domain, consisting of play-like movement, gamw, and sport, 
has a unique quality. Huizinga included in his definition of play . . the 
consciousness that it is 'different' from 'ordinary' life." (23:28) Holmes (79), 
referred to the child's world of play. Piaget referred to "the sphere of 
play." (33:296) Weiss suggested that "The athlete's world is set over 
against the everyday world." (43:245) Caillois (7) called play make-
believe. Zeigler referred to play as . . seemingly not concerned with 
the serious business of life." (46:102) "Games differ from serious considera­
tions. . . ," Lucas suggested. (86:4) "Play thus transcends ordinary behavior," 
according to Norbeck. (88:48) It would seem that the play domain has a 
uniqueness which sets it apart from ordinary life in that it escapes reality by 
being a discrete world. 
The uniqueness of the play domain seems to stem from the partici­
pant. The player enters the discrete world of play through an attitude. 
Huizinga called this attitude the "play-mood" or "play-spirit." (23:21) Caillois 
(49) called it freedom. Caillois considered freedom, which he defined as the 
need for relaxation, diversion, and fantasy, ". . . the indispensable prime mover 
of play." (49:50) The individual enters the play domain with an attitude of 
freedom ranging from joyous hilarity to contemplative enjoyment. The choice 
of entering this sphere is the player's own for he enters voluntarily. (7, 23, 
79, 102) 
Piay forms, however, are observable. The attitude of freedom or play-
spirit alone does not separate the play domain from ordinary life; behavior mutt 
result. When this attitude is manifested in patterned behavior, an individual 
can be said to be playing. Thus, behavioral patterns sponsored by the attitude 
of freedom originating in the individual separates the play domain from ordinary 
life and creates its uniqueness. To fully understand play behavior, the breadth 
of games, and/or the specificity of sport, the play domain must be analyzed. 
The piay domain can be codified. 
Behavior in the play domain revolves around a theme; it forms a 
pattern. For example, the individual may ritualize his play by running around 
obstacles in a certain pattern, or a child may contrive some rules for himself 
to follow. Observe an infant, Piaget (33) suggested, and note the number of 
rites which are performed. Piaget believed that these rites anticipate the rules 
31 
of games the child will play in the future. In play, the individual creates 
the rituals and the rules he will follow. They are not externally imposed 
upon him. Play involves an internal process of rule formulation. 
However, if each individual created his own rituals and rules, there 
could never be established standards against which other individuals might test 
themselves, as in bowling. Also, there would be chaos if two or more 
individuals wanted to play together. Thus, the need exists for mutually agreed 
upon rules or for the formalization of rules. The addition of externally 
imposed rules, which are a part of all games and sports, distinguish these 
play forms from play-like movements. Game rules are societal codifications of 
play rituals. They separate a game from the ordinary world by specifying 
the game's beginning and ending as well as giving it spatial boundaries. The 
rules create a common ground for playing. During the game, the rules 
become law. 
Norbeck suggested that human play is unique when compared with 
play found in other species ". . . because it is molded by culture, con­
sciously and unconsciously." (88:48) The culture consciously molds games 
and sport. Through a systematized process of rule formulation, games and 
sports are influenced by the culture within which they exist. Specified rules 
transform the play domain from a separate world governed by the individual 
into a discrete world affected by the culture. However, though cultural 
forces exert their influence on the play domain through rules, it remains a 
sphere set apart from ordinary life, seeking only in part to imitate reality. 
To play a game, the individual must learn the rules and conform to 
them. The individual's play-like movement and attitude are his own, but his 
behavior is guided and restricted by rules which are externally imposed upon 
him. For example, in basketball an individual may shoot for a basket in a 
way which he chooses, but he may not travel with the ball prior to 
releasing it nor may he hit an opponent while attempting to shoot. Without 
acknowledging and abiding by the externally imposed rules, the individual would 
not be playing the game. If an individual does not like the rules of a 
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game, he may exercise a certain amount of pressure on the individual or 
group who formulates, changes, and rescinds the rules. However, if the rules 
are not altered to his liking, they still must be followed in order to play 
the game. 
The sub-hypothesis, suggesting that the play domain can be codified, 
yielded six concepts. On the basis of the concepts listed below, the sub-
hypothesis is found tenable. 
1. In the play domain, behavioral patterns develop. 
2. The individual creates rituals and rules which govern his play-like 
movements. 
3. Society codifies play rituals. 
4. The codification of play rituals results in rules which establish 
common grounds for playing. 
5. In games and sport, the individual is specifically influenced by 
cultural patterns through rules which are externally imposed upon 
him. 
6. Formalized rules structure the play domain by increasing cultural 
influences and decreasing the individual's freedom. 
Games can be defined. 
Caillois (7), reworking the seven characteristics of play developed by 
Huizinga, defined play as free (voluntary), separate (circumscribed by spatial and 
temporal limits), uncertain (neither the course of play nor its result is known 
beforehand), unproductive (it is an end in itself with no material gain), 
governed by rules (the law of the temporary world), and make-believe (a 
distinct reality). All of these characteristics are applicable to games. 
Physical educators have classified games according to a number of 
criteria. Classifications have been made on the basis of the following: 1) the 
game's structure, for example, team and individual, 2) the emphasis given the 
game, for example, major and minor, 3) the season in which the game is 
played, for example, fall-winter and spring-summer, 4) the game's physical 
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environment, for example, land and aquatics, 5) the game's complexity, for 
example, low-organized and highly-organized. 
In 1959, Roberts, Arth, and Bush defined game . . as a recrea­
tional activity characterized by: (1) organized play, (2) competition, 
(3) two or more sides, (4) criteria for determining the winner, and 
(5) agreed-upon rules." (96:597) This definition puts an emphasis on 
agonistic games by virtue of the competitive quality cited, but it excludes some 
agonistic games, such as bowling, golf and archery, which do not depend upon 
sides or opponents to be games. Many so-called games in ethnographic studies 
are excluded by this definition. (97) The Roberts, Arth, and Bush definition 
of games seems to be too precise and too specialized and does not acknowledge 
the broad gamut of games. 
In the same study, Roberts, Arth, and Bush reviewed the distribution 
of game types in fifty societies and advanced a three-category classification of 
games. The three classifications included games of strategy, games of chance, 
and games of physical skills. The authors attributed the outcome of games 
to rational choices among possible alternatives (strategy), to guesses and uncon­
trolled artifacts such as dice (chance), and to players' motor abilities (physical 
skill). Games of strategy were related to social systems, games of chance to 
religious beliefs, and games of physical skill to environmental conditions. 
Using as a basis the works of Caillois (7), Roberts, Arth, and Bush 
(96), Loy defined game as ". . . any form of playful competition whose 
outcome is determined by physical skill, strategy, or chance employed singly 
and in combination." (85:1) Loy indicated that "playful competition" means 
that the contest has at least one play characteristic, as Caillois distinguished 
play characteristics. Such an explanation permits professional sports to be 
considered games. There is reason to question Loy on this point. Professional 
sports or athletics violate the essence of the play domain. The professional 
athlete's "play" is not play but work, because his "play" reaps material gain. 
For sports to remain sport within the play domain, it must be viewed as a 
subset of games. 
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Games, then, encompass sport. Distinctions have been drawn between 
games and sport. Loy suggested that the principal criterion for distinguishing 
them is that sport demands ". . the demonstration of physical prowess." 
(85:6) In other words, developed physical skills are required in sport. Also, 
Loy viewed sport ". . . as an institutionalized game." (85:6) By institu­
tionalized, he was not referring merely to the formulation and enactment of a 
set of rules but to the existence of cultural patterns and social structure in 
sport. The patterns of culture and social structure existing in sport, Loy 
contended, include values, norms, sanctions, knowledge, and social roles and 
statuses. Furthermore, Loy suggested that an institutionalized game . . has 
a tradition of past exemplifications and definite guide lines for future realiza­
tions." (85:7) In reference to the institutionalized game concept, Loy admitted 
that exceptions, such as chess and bridge, exist. Thus, sport encompasses only 
a part of the broad scope of games. It includes only those games which 
demand the demonstration of physical prowess and which depend upon the 
concept of competition to determine its outcome. Sport is a subset of games, 
a very specific form of some games. Many games exist which are not sports; 
all sports have their roots in games. 
Games exist within the play domain between the complexity of play 
and the specificity of sport. Games are a distinct entity set apart from 
ordinary life by the rules which define them and by behavioral patterns spon­
sored by the attitude of freedom in the participant. The sub-hypothesis that 
games can be defined is found tenable. 
There are levels of judgment in games. 
"Hey, that's not fair." "You can't play with us, you cheat." "You're 
not trying to win." "He's a bad sport." "Raise your hand, you hit it out." 
Statements such as these are often heard on the playground or echoing from 
the gymnasium. They suggest that there is an unwritten, yet supposedly under­
stood, concept which underlies the official rules of the game.. The "spirit of 
the game" has provided a convenient umbrella for this unwritten concept. 
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"Good sport" is the label usually attached to anyone who plays by this 
unwritten concept; violators are "bad sports." Cozens and Stumpf suggested 
that, "The spirit of sportsmanship becomes not so much a set of rules to 
be followed as an attitude of mind." (9:235) Underlying the written rules 
of the game appear to be the concepts of fair and unfair, right and wrong. 
These concepts seem to exist regardless of the written rules. 
Searle (39) suggested that some rules are not peculiar to a particular 
game but are crucial to competitive games generally. As an example, he 
suggested that a rule in competitive games is the commitment by a player or 
team to try to win. There is another rule common to competitive games 
generally. While there is a commitment to win in competitive games, there 
is also a commitment to "play fair." Huizinga defined fair play as ". . . 
good faith expressed in play terms." (23:211) Braithwaite (5) suggested that 
fair play involves collaboration on common ground when the wants and goals 
of individuals are different. The common ground in games is the game rules. 
According to Singer. (40), a player violates the rights of others if he violates 
the rules of the game because the rules determine when the game has been 
fairly played and who has fairly won. Cooperation, or agreement to follow 
the rules, then, is necessary to competition. Unless there is agreement to 
cooperate and follow the rules, there can be no game. Yet, with regard to 
the concepts of winning and playing fairly, no rules requiring such commitments 
have been formulated officially. These examples suggest the existence of an 
underlying spirit of the game and seem to make an appeal for understanding 
the reason for rules. 
Piaget studied children playing games and found that they recognized 
the importance of following established rules but also developed "... a sort 
of ideal or spirit of the game. . . (33:73) It would seem that there 
are levels of judgment in games. 
The opportunity to develop such judgment seems to occur in less 
institutionalized game activity, as on playgrounds and in backyards. In less 
institutionalized game activity where there is seldom an official to enforce the 
official rules, game rules tend to be changed and modified by the participants 
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to fit the circumstances. For example, in softball, pitchers frequently throw 
the ball slower when the batter can not hit well or has a physical handicap. 
Only one base on an error is a common modification. No stealing today, 
the catcher's arm is hurt. These rules are not written in an official softball 
guide, yet they appeal to a spirit which underlies the official rules. When 
individuals change the rules to fit the circumstances, they are playing "a" game 
of softball rather than "the" game of softball. Playing "a" game of softball 
implies that a modification of the official game is being played; the official 
game is not. However, even in less institutionalized games, once the rules 
are agreed upon by the participants, there can be no laying aside of the rules 
unless another mutual agreement has been reached. 
As -games become more institutionalized, more specialized, and more 
highly organized, the legislated enactments are followed more closely and without 
exception. Yet, the spirit of the game still exists to be recognized. A 
basketball player who has started a fast break but slows down because she 
sees that an opponent has fallen recognizes the spirit of the game. The rules 
do not govern her behavior in that instance. She is exercising her judgment 
based upon an understanding of the reason for rules. 
Fair play, in its truest sense, is not created by a legislator's fiat; 
fair play is a concept. Underlying the play domain are the concepts of fair­
ness and rightness. These concepts become an attitude, the spirit of the game. 
Deliberately breaking a game rule and using it to one's advantage or to a 
team's advantage destroys the game. Without the spirit of the game, the 
game loses its meaning and play perishes. 
In light of the foregoing discussion, it appears that there are two 
distinguishable levels of judgment in games. 
1. One level of judgment is based upon the recognition of established 
rules. 
2. The other level of judgment is based upon an understanding of 
the reason for rules. ' This level has been identified as the spirit 
of the game. 
The sub-hypothesis is found tenable. 
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Games reflect culture. 
Recently, the emphasis in the study of games has shifted from 
attempting to establish their universality to considering them as cultural phe­
nomena. (68) The relationship between culture and game forms is being 
studied increasingly. Hunt (24) has pointed out that the culture and traits 
of a people are revealed in the traditional games and sports which are played. 
For example, English folk games reflect the appreciation which the English 
have for tradition, while German games attest to Germanic adherence to 
austerity and their emphasis on developing physical strength. (24) Dundes 
suggested that "Games may be considered to be structural models of the adult 
world in a given culture." (10:315) Glassford (53) argued that a relation­
ship exists between game forms and culture. Culture, Glassford stressed, should 
be viewed as a whole composed of interrelated parts, the parts consisting of 
behavioral codes, environment, and population. When culture is viewed as a 
totality, changes in one part of it tend to cause changes in other parts, thus 
changing the whole of culture. Glassford argued that games serve culture in 
the sphere of behavioral codes and in so doing should reflect changes which 
occur in the culture. Games, then, as a part of culture, change as other 
parts of the culture change. 
If games reflect culture, evidence should suggest a positive relationship 
between the following: 1) the structure of a culture and the structure of 
games existing in that culture, 2) cultural changes and game changes. In­
vestigation of such relationships should include less complex cultures which have 
minimally structured social orders and very little technology and more complex 
cultures which have multifaceted social orders and advanced technology. 
As discussed in Chapter II, culture can be studied in terms of 
ideological, organizational, and technological dimensions. If games reflect culture, 
games should contain remnants of the beliefs and values, social structure, and 
technology which exist within the culture. 
Unfortunately, as Damm (50) pointed out, published material on games 
in primitive cultures is incomplete and unevenly distributed globally. The 
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ethnographic studies which have been published, however, indicate that the 
games in the cultures studied tended to reflect the basic social organization 
existing within each culture. (48, 53, 74, 100, 101) Glassford, for example, 
who studied the traditional Canadian Eskimos, concluded that the games in 
that culture . . tended to reflect the maximum, cooperative patterns of 
organization which tended to prevail within their culture." (53:81) The 
Tangu culture of New Guinea, Burridge (48) reported, is based upon the 
concept of equivalence, a notion of moral equality which is practically ex­
pressed through exchanging equivalent amounts of foodstuffs. This difficult task, 
according to Burridge, can rarely be accomplished except through mutual agree­
ment. Taketak, a game which is popular with the Tangue, has the same 
notion of equivalence expressed in it. Burridge also reported that other New 
Guinea cultures have the concept of establishing equilibrium in their games. 
In another study of primitive cultures, Dunlap (74) pointed out that when new 
games were introduced into the Samoan culture by foreign missionaries, the 
games were modified to conform more closely with the traditional play customs 
of the Samoan culture. 
Reviewing the games of fifty tribes, Roberts, Arth and Bush (96) 
found that five tribes had no games at all. The cultures in which no com­
petitive games existed were mainly Australian and South American. These 
cultures were kin homogeneous and very simple. It was suggested earlier in 
this paper that the Roberts, Arth, and Bush definition of games seemed too 
precise and too specialized, thus excluding some games. It is possible that 
games may have existed in those extremely simple cultures but in such simple 
forms that the definition excluded them, since Murdock, (63) an anthropologist, 
noted that games are a common denominator of all cultures. 
Games in more complex cultures have been studied and comparisons 
made with games in less complex cultures. Sutton-Smith (68) distinguished 
between the ascriptive game culture and the achievement game culture. Ascriptive 
cultures, according to Sutton-Smith, are characterized by relatively fixed role 
statuses; in other words, role expectations are usually based upon imitating the 
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parent's role. Achievement cultures are characterized by considerable role 
flexibility; a variety of roles are tried. Sutton-Smith studied the historical 
changes of children's games covering the past one hundred years in New 
Zealand and then in the United States. His findings led him to observe, 
"The type of rule games with their considerable complexity which have 
developed over the past hundred years are apparently the natural successor 
to this increasing flexibility." (68:145) The complex organization of games 
in achievement cultures . . requires considerable role flexibility, role 
expectation and the understanding of the roles of others." (68:145) This role 
flexibility required in achievement game cultures was a shift from the particular 
roles which emerged within ascriptive game cultures. 
Norbeck (88) discussed the relationship of play preferences to culture. 
As an example, he cited the Japanese whose engrained values and attitudes 
reflect a preference for avoiding physical contact and maintaining social decorum. 
The popular games in the complex culture of Japan, Norbeck maintained, 
preserve physical and social distance. 
Roberts, Arth, and Bush (96), in a study discussed earlier, advanced 
a three-category classification of games. Games take the forms of physical 
skill, chance, and strategy employed singularly or in combination with each 
other. Games of strategy, such as chess and poker, were related to social 
systems. An hypothesis was advanced and supported that social systems should 
be complex if a form of expression, such as games of strategy, develops 
within the culture. Thus, less complex cultures with minimally structured social 
orders should not contain games of strategy. Roberts and Sutton-Smith (97), 
using the same classification of games, found at least one of the game forms 
missing in the less complex cultures. All the game forms were found in the 
more complex cultures. 
Technology creates change and adds new variables; in other words, 
technology creates complexity. In more complex cultures, games increase in 
numbers and types. Some of these game changes are due directly to 
technological advances, for example water skiing and sky diving. As cultures 
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grow in complexity, games grow in complexity. As Luschen (62) noted, games 
in primitive, less complex cultures are more universal in their meaning and 
manifest functions than in modern, more complex cultures where the meaning 
and manifest functions are more specific and segmentary. Investigation of 
the structure of games in less complex cultures and more complex cultures 
seems to support a positive relationship between the structure of culture and 
the structure of games in that culture. Games contain remnants of the 
beliefs and values, social structure, and technology which exist within the 
culture. 
If games reflect culture, then, as the culture changes, games should 
change. It is generally recognized that the less complex a culture, the more 
informal the rules. As the culture becomes more complex, the rules become 
more formal. If games reflect culture, the same pattern should exist in 
games. The less complex the game, the more informal are the rules; the more 
complex the game, the more formal are the rules. 
Physical educators indirectly have alluded to such a pattern. In a 
discussion of women's competitive sport programs. Chapman (71) noted that 
as such programs develop there is a need for more precisely written rules. 
Van Dalen, Mitchell, and Bennett (42), in discussing the evolution of football, 
referred to football as a game and later as a sport. The inference was 
that as the game's rules continued to be modified, a sport emerged. Loy 
(85), as discussed earlier, suggested that such a pattern of game complexity 
related to rule formality exists although he carefully defined other emergent 
patterns in attempting to differentiate games from sport. 
A pattern seems to emerge that a positive relationship exists between 
game complexity and rule formality. For example, sport, a group of very 
specialized games, is characterized by great rule formality. Football never 
ceases to be a game, but due, at least in part, to its great rule formality, 
it is categorized as a sport. 
Evidence suggested a positive relationship between the following: 
1) the structure of a culture and the structure of games existing in that culture. 
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2) cultural changes, as viewed through rules, and changes in games, as viewed 
through rules. The sub-hypothesis that games reflect culture is supported. 
Summary. 
Analysis of the pertinent literature led to the support and acceptance 
of the four sub-hypotheses as follows: 
1. The play domain can be codified. 
2. Games can be defined. 
3. There are levels of judgment in games. 
4. Games reflect culture. 
As a result of the evidence in support of the sub-hypotheses, the major 
hypothesis that all cultures have games is accepted as tenable. 
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CHAPTER V 
GAME RULES 
Hypothesis. 
There are game rules. 
Sub-hypotheses. 
1. Game rules are distinctive. 
2. Game rules have identifiable characteristics. 
3. Game rules can be classified. 
4. Game rules serve various functions. 
Introduction. 
All games have certain common characteristics, one of which is that 
they are governed by rules. (2, 4, 7, 23, 26, 33, 39, 40, 43, 46, 79, 97) 
Games of agon have a commonality. In agonistic games, the player relies 
only on himself and concentrates all his efforts on doing his best. (7) The 
player's skill determines the outcome in agonistic games, as in sport. Since 
agonistic games encompass sport, the term "game rule" represents the rules 
governing both agonistic games and sports. Game rules distinguish the distinct 
reality called a game and control the behavior of those engaged in it. 
Game rules are distinctive. 
Philosophers have addressed themselves to the analysis of game rulei. 
Baier (2) called game rules "rules of procedure." Rawls (91) fitted game 
rules into his practice conception of rules. Black (4) suggested their simi» 
larity to regulations. Searle (39) considered game rules to be constitutive. 
Rules of procedure, according to Baier (2) constitute certain rule-
determined activities. An individual can not engage in such activities unless 
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the rules are known. Examples of such rule-determined activities are playing 
a game, working on a university degree, or prosecuting someone. 
Rawls (91) drew an analogy between game rules and a practice 
conception of rules. A practice conception of rules refers to rules which 
define a practice. To engage in a practice is to follow the appropriate 
rules. Unless an individual follows the rules which define the practice, he 
is not engaging in the practice. The practice conception explains rules which 
are used in a strict rather than summary sense. 
To perform actions which are specified by a certain practice is to 
follow the rules defining the practice. When an action is specified by a 
practice, there can be no reason for a particular action by a particular person 
except by reference to the practice. For example, in softball, a pitcher must 
deliver the ball with an underhand action. The pitcher need not justify his 
action; he is simply doing what the rule defining softball pitching has estab­
lished for that practice. If a group of softball players or followers believed 
that the underhand pitch was destroying the game of softball, they must aim 
their objections at the rule defining the practice of pitching underhand, not 
at the pitcher. 
Rawls believed that the practice conception helped individuals to 
understand legal arguments more than moral arguments. However, he admitted 
that there are a number of border-line cases which are difficult, if not 
impossible, to classify. 
Black (4) suggested that there are certain activities which are con­
stituted by rules, such as games, and certain activities which are controlled by 
rules, such as driving a car. There is a distinction, according to Black. If 
there were no regulations pertaining to driving in a particular community, it 
would still be possible to drive. But, if there were no rules constituting a 
game, it would be impossible to play the game. The distinction can become 
blurred, Black indicated. For example, when activities are controlled by rules, 
there will be those individuals who obey the rules for driving and will 
consider such rules as constituting the activity of driving a car. So regula­
tions, in Black's sense, are similar to game rules but are not analogous. 
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Searle (39) drew a distinction between "regulative" and "constitutive" 
rules. Regulative rules, according to Searle, control behavior which exists 
prior to or independent of the rules. Gentlemen are to wear ties to dinner, 
is a regulative rule because the activity of wearing ties to dinner can exist 
prior to or independent of the rule. 
In addition to regulating behavior, Searle suggested that constitutive 
rules ". . . create or define new forms of behavior." (39:33) By new forms 
of behavior, Searle meant behavior which receives specifications or descriptions 
by virtue of the rules alone. The specification, they played volleyball, could 
not be made without rules. Twelve people could go through all the physical 
movements done in a volleyball game, but without rules there would be no 
game of volleyball. 
The existence of e constitutive activity, then, is dependent upon con­
stitutive rules; the rules create, as well as regulate, the activity. "Side-out" is 
called following the infringement of a rule by the serving team in volleyball, 
with the service being awarded to the opposing team. Such a rule, Searle 
argued, seems to define side-out. In other words, side-out exists because the 
rule established what side-out is. Thus, side-out in volleyball is achieved in a 
prescribed way, and it becomes a rule. 
Searle noted that any system of constitutive rules has degrees of cen-
trality. in other words, some rules form the core of a particular game and 
set it apart from other games. Eliminate the use of a net or prohibit the 
use of the hands, and the game of volleyball is drastically changed; it becomes 
a different game. Yet, neither the net rule or the rule establishing the legal 
use of the hands when considered separately constitute volleyball. Some rules, 
however, can be changed without greatly affecting the game. Double fouls 
could be eliminated in volleyball by requiring the officials to establish which 
team committed the foul first. Volleyball would not be drastically changed 
by eliminating the double foul rule. Searle called such a rule a "fringe" 
rule. Thus, game rules form a system with some rules being more important 
to the structure of the total game than others. 
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A major theme has permeated the pertinent literature regarding the 
distinctiveness of game rules. Game rules are distinct from other rules in 
that they constitute an activity called a game. Thus, the sub-hypothesis is 
found tenable. 
Game rules have identifiable characteristics. 
Philosophers, * such as Hart (19), Rawls (39), and Weiss (43), have 
alluded to the similarity of game rules and law. The concept of law, as 
developed by Hart, was used as a starting point and model against which 
game rules were compared with law. 
Hart (19) maintained that at the core of a legal system was a 
union of primary and secondary rules. Primary rules of obligation, according 
to Hart, are unofficial rules which are needed so that individuals can coexist 
in close proxmity with one another. Restrictions are put on such things as 
the free use of violence, theft, and deception. In order to maintain primary 
rules of obligation. Hart stressed, a majority of the group must support the 
rules so that there is social pressure to conform to primary rules. Hart 
identified three defects of primary rules: 1) their uncertainty, 2) their 
static character, 3) the inefficiency of diffuse social pressure toward conformity. 
Primary rules are uncertain, because such rules are not easily recognized. The 
difficulty in identifying primary rules results from their not being formally 
written down, enacted, and enforced. The rules do not form a system as 
is possible when rules are legislated. Thus, the informality of primary rules 
leads to uncertainty. Primary rules are static in nature. Difficulty in 
changing them occurs because no one is granted the authority to change them. 
Primary rules are supported by diffuse social pressure. Since no one is 
empowered with the responsibility of enforcing primary rules and defining 
penalties for breaches of such rules, conformity to them is left to whomever 
cares to assume the responsibility. Inefficiency results. Thus, primary rules 
of obligation or customs, as they are frequently called, are unofficial rules 
which place restrictions on individuals so that social order might be maintained. 
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The defects of primary rules are rectified by secondary rules. Secondary 
rules are official rules, or law. When an authority, empowered by secondary 
rules, acknowledges primary rules, they become official. This "rule of recog­
nition," as Hart called it, overcomes the uncertainty of primary rules. When 
an individual or body of persons is given the power by secondary rules to 
enact or repeal rules, "rules of change" are in effect. These rules of change 
overcome the static character of primary rules. When secondary rules confer 
power on someone to decide when a primary rule is broken and to define the 
procedure for imposing the penalty, "rules of adjudication" are in effect. These 
rules of adjudication overcome the inefficiency of diffuse social pressure character­
istic of primary rules. 
Law, then, according to Hart's concept, is characterized principally by 
an authoritative mark, legislative enactment, and centralization of social pressure. 
Although Fuller (16) criticized Hart's "rule of recognition" (Fuller maintained 
that the "rule of recognition" is a procedure and not merely a granting of 
authority). Hart's concept of law can be used as a basic criterion for analyzing 
game rules. Analysis of game rules, in light of Hart's concept of law, yielded 
five identifiable characteristics. 
1) Game rules have an authoritative mark. Hart called this authorita­
tive mark the "rule of recognition." Within the "rule of recognition" category, 
Hart distinguished between rules conferring legal powers and rules imposing duties. 
The conferring of legal powers implies that a person, board, commission, or 
body is given the rightful power to identify the specific rules which constitute 
the legal system or the game. When the authority acknowledges a rule, it 
becomes an official rule and is easily recognized. Since an official rule is 
specific, it imposes a specific duty. For example, a rule stipulates that the 
game of volleyball is played with a spherical ball. The rule includes specific 
qualifications as to what constitutes a volleyball. Players must use a spherical 
ball which conforms with the rule specifications if they wish to play officially 
the game of volleyball. 
Hart pointed out that primary or unofficial rules do not form systems 
because such rules tend to be vague and uncertain. Secondary or official 
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rules can be made to form systems since the authority can specifically select 
rules in an orderly fashion in order to accomplish a specific purpose. Traffic 
laws are an example. Laws are enacted and enforced for the purpose of 
safeguarding individuals from the misuse of motor vehicles. A system of laws 
regulating driving has been developed. As it is with secondary rules, so it 
is with game rules, as Searle suggested. Game rules form a system called a 
game. When a number of rules are specifically designated as game rules by 
the rightful authority, a system develops. The rules become interdependent in 
order to serve their purpose. 
2) Game rules are legislated. (4, 43, 71) The legislated rules are 
what is meant by the official rules. A governing body formulates, writes down, 
announces, and enacts the rules of a particular game. Thus, the histories of 
legislated rules can be traced, as Black (4) suggested, because such rules are 
made official at a particular time. The formal structure then permits the 
altering, changing, or rescinding of such rules through written suggestion and 
appeal to the governing body. A recent decision illustrates this process of 
changing a legislated rule. The rule specifying the number of players on a 
women's basketball team has been changed after extensive experimentation with 
the new rule. In the spring of 1971, the Joint Division for Girls and 
Women's Sports—Amateur Athletic Union Basketball Rules Committee officially 
adopted the rule that five players instead of six players constitute a women's 
basketball team. The newly adopted rule appears in the Division for Girls 
and Women's Sports Basketball Guide 1971-72 as an official rule. 
Legislated rules apply to all persons in a particular category. (2) 
The particular category when referring to games is everyone who participates 
in the particular game. The rules are used only for those who play the 
game; but once in the game, no one, including the legislators, is exempt from 
obeying the rules. According to Baier, when an order is addressed to a 
category of people, ". . . the first step in the direction of law is taken." 
(2:138) 
An advantage of legislated rules lies in quickly and deliberately being 
able to adopt, alter, or abolish a rule if the rule is found to be beneficial. 
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ineffective, or harmful to the persons affected by the rule. (2, 19) It is 
impossible to assess, with any degree of accuracy, how long it would have 
taken for women to unofficially adopt the five player basketball game. 
3) Game rules are enforced by a judge. Enforcement of rules by 
a judge are the "rules of adjudipation" to which Hart (19) alluded. Baier 
(2) asserted that a legal system must have an individual or group of indivi­
duals who are recognized by the group as having the authority to judge if 
everyone is acting in accordance with the rules of the group and to administer 
the penalty stipulated by the rules for any offense. In games, the authorized 
judge of a player's actions is the official. 
Officials must show evidence of written and practical knowledge of 
the game rules as well as techniques for overseeing play, recognizing infringe­
ments, and administering penalties within a specific game. When evidence of 
such competencies is shown, the individual is authorized by the game's govern­
ing body as an official "judge." The official must accept and enforce the 
official rules. (2) The official rules are the law of the game. 
An official must make decisions as to whether or not the rules have 
been broken. Once a decision has been made, it is final. The violator has 
no defense, and the penalty is imposed by the impartial judge. 
Hart (19) pointed out that, although an official's decisions are final, 
they are not infallible. Up to a certain point, incorrect decisions will be 
tolerated by the players, and the game can continue. According to Hart, 
when official aberrations become frequent, the players can either stop accepting 
the official's aberrant rulings, or they can accept them, and thus the game has 
changed. 
Some game rules, such as in volleyball and softball, make provisions 
for legally protesting the decision of an official. Protests are allowed on rule 
interpretation or rule misinterpretation, not on matters of fact or on matters 
involving accuracy of judgment. For example, the umpire's accuracy in judging 
whether a pitch was a strike or a ball can not be protested, but the 
umpire's failure to impose the correct penalty for a specific violation can be 
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protested. In order to be valid, a protest must be made in the manner 
designated by the rules. The protest is sent to the individual or committee, 
authorized by the governing body of the game. It then becomes the respon­
sibility of the higher authority to act upon the protest by finding the protest 
valid or invalid. 
Some game rules do not allow the official to make a decision until 
the request for a ruling is made by a player. This situation is defined as 
an appeal play. Baseball and softball, for example, have such a play. The 
game rules define specifically the situations which are governed by the appeal 
play. Batting out of order and a baserunner missing a base are two appeal 
plays. An appeal must be made to the official before the next pitch. If 
the defensive team appeals properly, It then becomes the duty of the official 
to render a decision by finding the appeal valid or invalid. If the official 
finds the apoeal valid by agreeing with the defensive team, he administers the 
penalty defined by the rules. 
4) Qame rules have physical sanotlons. Since game rules are legislated, 
It follows that there Is a defined, authorized system of enforcement or punish* 
ment. Hart (19) called it the centralization of social pressure. In other 
words, the sanctions have been Institutionalized; a governing body has established 
speelflo penalties for violations of speoiflo rules. As a result of the Institutionali­
zation, sanctions are highly determinate and organized. Prior to breaking a rule, 
a player knows the penalty which will be Imposed for violating a particular 
rule. Before the game begins, a basketball player knows that the consequences 
of "traveling" Is loss of the ball to the opponents out-of-bounds. 
The authorized consequences for a breach of a game rule are well 
defined and predictable. There can be psychological and physiological conse­
quences of violations, as Baler (47) suggested, but such consequences are difficult 
to predict. For example, the violation of a rule during some crucial part of 
a game may cause a psychological let-down or a psychological commitment to 
play better by individual players or by an entire team. Thus, the authorized 
consequences of violating a rule are well defined and predictable while the 
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psychological and physiological consequences of violations are varied and unpre­
dictable. 
5) Game rules are exactly defined. Formality and specificity 
characterize the nature of game rules. The fact that such rules are legis­
lated verifies their formality and specificity. In addition, the terms and 
expressions used in particular games are defined. Official guides or rule books 
contain a rule which defines the terms of the game. An "ace" in tennis 
and the "infield fly" in softball are defined by the rules. 
Exceptions are written into game rules. (2, 91) As Rawls suggested, 
an exception to a rule of practice takes the form of "... a qualification 
or of a further specification of the rule." (91:27) In basketball, for 
example, jump balls are usually taken between the opposing players involved 
in the play. There are, however, times when this procedure for taking jump 
balls is not followed. The exceptions are when injury or disqualification occurs 
to one of the jumpers and, under specified circumstances, when any two 
opposing players are allowed to participate in the jump ball. Thus, the rule 
governing jump balls includes stipulations for jump ball occurences which do 
not fit the basic pattern established by the jump ball rule. 
In order to assure the definitiveness of rules, other services are 
usually provided by the governing body of the game. When difficulty in under­
standing certain rules is anticipated, a section on the clarification of rules is 
occasionally added to the publication of the rules, as in the guides published 
by the Division for Girls and Women's Sports. For example, in field hockey, 
the rule governing corners stipulates where the ball is to be placed for a 
corner and penalty corner but makes no reference to the position of the 
player taking the corner hit. This haziness is clarified with a section prior 
to the official rules which notes that the player taking any ". . . corner hit 
may stand with her feet in any position, provided the ball is placed in 
accordance with the rule." (25:78) In addition, the governing bodies usually 
provide a committee which functions to interpret the meaning of specific rules 
upon request. 
51 
Using Hart's concept of law as a model, game rules were analyzed. 
Through this analysis, five basic characteristics of game rules have been identi­
fied, enabling the sub-hypothesis to be found tenable. 
1. Game rules have an authoritative mark. 
2. Game rules are legislated. 
3. Game rules are enforced by a judge. 
4. Game rules have physical sanctions. 
5. Game rules are exactly defined. 
Game rules can be classified. 
Searle (39) noted that constitutive rules, under which game rules fall, 
can be classified into two categories. First, constitutive rules create or define 
new forms of behavior. This role of constitutive rules has already been 
examined. In review, certain actions receive new meaning when performed 
under constitutive rules. In other words, constitutive rules create meaning. The 
rules of tennis must be followed in order to play the game of tennis. The 
rule for "side-out" defines side-out in volleyball. Second, Searle suggested 
that "X counts as Y in context C." (39:36) Substituting words for symbols, 
field goal ("X") counts as points ("Y") in basketball (context "C"). 
"X counts as Y in context C" has two qualifications, according to 
Searle. This statement applies to the entire system of constitutive rules and 
not to individual rules within the system. Abiding solely by the rule, a 
volleyball team is composed of six players, does not constitute playing volleyball. 
But, when all the rules or a large enough subset of the rules are followed, 
then the game of volleyball is played. This qualification, according to Searle, 
suggests that within constitutive rule systems, "Y" indicates consequences to 
the "X" terms. For example, touchdown ("X") counts as points ("Y") in 
football ("C"); offsides ("X") causes a penalty ("Y") in field hockey ("C"). 
Mabbott (26) classified game rules into two categories: constitutive 
and regulative. Constitutive rules determine the game; for example, each batter 
gets three strikes in softball. Constitutive rules do not need to be justified, 
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Mabbott claimed. If an individual does not like the rules, he does not have 
to play the game. Regulative rules, according to Mabbott, can be altered 
without changing the entire nature of the game. If the rule for offsides in 
field hockey was altered, field hockey would still be played. 
Hart (19) indicated that there exists a contrast within the rules of 
a game. There are those rules which specify the ways of scoring and winning. 
Other rules within the same game veto certain actions and establish penalties for 
the violation of such rules. 
In support of the sub-hyppthesis, two distinct classifications of game 
rules have been extracted from the literature. 
1. One class of game rules is constitutive and as such defines par­
ticular games. 
2. The other class of game rules is regulative and as such governs 
conduct in games by permitting or forbidding certain actions and 
establishing penalties when violations occur. 
Game rules serve various functions. 
It has been established that all games are governed by rules and that 
game rules should be studied as systems rather than individually. Game rules 
serve four specific functions. First, rules constitute games. (2, 4, 19, 26, 
39, 91) Without rules there could be no games. Second, the behavior of 
game participants is regulated by rules. (19, 26, 39, 40) Third, game rules 
are cultural influences on the play domain. Fourth, agonistic game rules 
equalize opportunity. 
Rules constitute games. Since games are constituted by certain rules, 
following the rules is essential to the existence of a game. Black (4) pointed 
out that following the rules means knowing the rules, using them as motives 
for actions, and citing them as defenses for actions. If an individual refuses 
to pay attention to the rules, he can not be said to be playing a game. 
The constitutive quality of game rules suggests that the rules, or at 
least some of the rules, specifically define the game. Rules which establish 
53 
the spatial and temporal boundaries, designate the equipment to be used, state 
the aim of the game, and stipulate how to score are all definite in nature. 
In defining a game, the rules also give specific meaning to certain 
actions. Sliding into a "bag" becomes moving to a base in softball. Tossing 
a ball through a hoop becomes scoring a field goal in basketball. (39, 91) 
Another function of game rules is that of regulating the behavior of 
players. Acting in accordance with the rules requires a thorough knowledge and 
understanding of the game rules. When the rules are followed, the game pro­
ceeds without interruption; but, when a player's behavior transgresses a rule, 
the game temporarily stops, and a penalty, defined by the rules, is imposed. 
Since rules define a game, Rawls (91) argued that appeals can be made to the 
rules in order to correct the behavior of players. 
Following the rules does not mean that the rules explain the details 
of techniques and skills necessary to play the game. The rules may define 
some skills, such as an air dribble or pivot in basketball, but such definitions 
are only for the purpose of clarifying the limitations of such skills. The 
latitude and freedom of players' behavior while acting in accordance with the 
rules is dependent upon the players' ingenuity and ability. The rules set 
limits, and the players play according to their nature, needs, and desires within 
those limits. 
Game rules, as a third function, act as cultural influences on the play 
domain. An authorized group of individuals, all of whom have been Influenced 
by their society and by pervading cultural forces, create, enact, and rescind game 
rules. Thus, the rules of a game reflect the culture in which the rules 
originated. Since rules constitute games, games reflect culture. Knowledge of 
the origin of a game through its rules would seem important in attempting to 
understand the nature of a particular game. For this reason, baseball, which 
originated in the United States, was partially used as an instrument to teach 
the Japanese about democracy after World War II. (57) The system of game 
rules which comprise baseball carries with it the cultural patterns of those who 
formulated the rules. 
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A fourth function is that agonistic rules equalize opportunity. Accord­
ing to Caillois (7), agonistic game rules equalize opportunity by creating 
equality of chance from the beginning of the contest and by making adjust­
ments relative to participants' abilities. For example, at the start of each 
game, all external elements, such as boundaries and equipment, are defined and 
limited by the rules. Some game rules allow for handicaps to be assigned 
to players with superior skill, thus removing another inequality. 
Throughout the game, rules provide equalization in yet another way. 
Rule transgressors are penalized. The administration of a penalty restores the 
game and sets opponents on an equal basis again. 
By equalizing opportunity, it is assumed that the winner is best 
because, according to Caillois (7, 49), victory was determined by superior skill 
resulting from extensive training, arduous effort, a desire to excel, and the will 
to win. In agonistic games, everyone is given an equal chance to win so the 
victor's superiority is indisputable. Ellen Griffin (107) summarized the equaliz­
ing function of game rules well, "Rules don't make everyone equal, but everyone 
is equal under the rules." 
An examination of the pertinent literature yielded four functions of 
agonistic game rules, as follows: 
1. Game rules constitute games. 
2. Game rules regulate the behavior of players. 
3. Game rules serve as cultural influences on the play domain. 
4. Game rules equalize opportunity. 
The sub-hypothesis that game rules serve various functions is found tenable. 
Summary. 
Examination of the pertinent literature led to the support and acceptance 
of the four sub-hypotheses as follows: 
1. Game rules are distinctive. 
2. Game rules have identifiable characteristics. 
3. Game rules can be classified. 
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4. Game rules serve various functions. 
As a result of the evidence in support of the sub-hypotheses, the major 
hypothesis that there are game rules is accepted as tenable. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF MORAL RULES TO GAME RULES 
Hypothesis. 
Moral rules and game rules are philosophically congruent within their 
respective provinces. 
Sub-hypotheses. 
1. A concept exists which is basic to both moral rules and game rules. 
2. Moral rules are to morality what game rules are to games. 
3. Morality and the spirit of the game are comparable phenomena. 
Introduction. 
Rules are the interpretations of many acts which have similer characteris­
tics or which occur under similar circumstances. Moral rules are societal codifi­
cations of the concept of morality. Game rules are societal codifications of 
play rituals. If a philosophical congruency is found between moral rules and 
game rules, there may be reason to suggest that games could be used to teach 
morality. 
A concept exists which is basic to both moral rules and game rules. 
The basis of morality, hence of moral rules, is the concept of what 
constitutes Tightness and wrongness. Moral rules are society's codification of 
that concept. The way in which the underlying concept of Tightness and wrong­
ness is codified and senctioned determines in part, whether the interpretation is 
legal in nature or moral in nature. When institutional procedures exist to pro­
mulgate, administer, and enforce this concept, lews exist. Moral rules have no 
such institutional procedures to codify and sanction them; they exist without 
legislated enactment and enforcement. (2, 19, 51) 
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Underlying games and game rules are the concepts of right and wrong, 
fair and unfair. It has been established earlier that game rules serve four 
functions. Two of the functions of game rules are of particular importance 
here. Game rules regulate the behavior of players, and game rules equalize 
opportunity. The determination of right behavior and wrong behavior and the 
equalization of opportunity are based upon interpretations of the concepts of 
right and wrong, fair and unfair. When institutional procedures are used to 
promulgate, administer, and enforce these concepts, game rules exist. Game 
rules become the law in games. 
Besides the official game rules, a concept identified as the spirit of 
the game exists. The basis of this spirit is a concept of what constitutes 
Tightness and wrongness. Feelings of honesty, fairness, and integrity are ex­
pressions of this concept. The spirit of the game is not a legislated system 
but is a code of behavior to which individuals subscribe by virtue of its 
pervading spirit of Tightness. 
Thus, two interpretations of the concept of rightness and wrongness 
appear in games. One is legal in nature, the other is moral in nature. Game 
rules are legal. The spirit of the game is moral. However, although the 
process of interpreting the concept of rightness and wrongness differs, basic to 
both moral rules and game rules is a concept of rightness and wrongness. The. 
sub-hypothesis is found tenable. 
Mora/ rules are to morality what game rules are to games. 
A concept of what constitutes rightness and wrongness has been 
identified as basic to both moral rules and game rules. However, the processes 
of codifying and sanctioning moral rules and game rules seem to differ im­
mensely. Eight characteristics of moral rules were identified in Chapter III, 
and five characteristics of game rules were identified in Chapter V. A com­
parison of the identifiable characteristics should indicate the degree of relation­
ship between moral rules and game rules. 
Moral rules are characterized by vagueness and indefiniteness. They 
are neither written down nor formally announced; informality surrounds them. 
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In addition, the concepts with which moral rules deal make them difficult to 
define. Game rules, on the other hand, are exactly defined. They are 
written down and announced. The inclusion of precise specifications and stated 
exceptions thoroughly defines the meaning and scope of the game rules. 
Moral rules contain ethical terms, such as ought-ought not, right-wrong, 
should-should not. In other words, moral rules give advice and guide action. 
Game rules contain action-guiding words, such as shall-shall not, may-may not. 
The structural form of moral rules is not as important as the purpose of 
moral rules, which is to guide action. Tha classification of game rules which 
regulate the behavior of players seems to contain terms which give advice and 
guide action, as moral rules do. 
Moral rules are social in nature. Since game rules are societal codifi­
cations of play rituals, it would seem that game rules are social in nature also. 
Game rules are imposed by social forces upon the individual. They establish 
standards so that the game can be repeated any number of times yet within 
the same boundaries and with the same restrictions on everyone who playa. 
An impartial judge is given the power to see that the rules are followed. 
The official rules of the game do not permit personal game rules to exist. 
Since the rules constitute the game, the official rules which are externally im­
posed upon the individual must be followed if the game is to be played. 
Thus, game rules are social in nature. 
Another characteristic of moral rules is that they are not legislated. 
The moral code of a society is not established by a formal organization as 
is the case with game rules. Rules of a game become official by a legis­
lator's fiat. 
Another identifiable characteristic of moral rules is that they impose 
obligations. Since all rules which govern human behavior impose obligations, 
game rules should be no exception. Essentially, the purpose behind moral 
rules and game rules is to establish guidelines within which interacting indivi­
duals can live and play safely and. confidently. Without acknowledgment of 
the rules by societal members and players, confusion and chaos would reign. 
Thus, the purpose behind rules fosters the obligation to follow them. However, 
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individuals seldom completely understand the reason behind rules; therefore, 
forces external to the individual are needed to assure compliance to the rules. 
Compliance to the obligation imposed by moral rules is a function of the 
group. Diffusion of social pressure, however, tends to make this process 
inefficient for assuring conformity to moral rules. Compliance to the obligation 
imposed by game rules is more specific and efficient. An individual or group 
of individuals is given the authority to enforce the rules of the game and to 
administer penalties for offenses. Thus, game rules impose obligations as moral 
rules do, but the process of assuring compliance to game rules is more 
specific and efficient than for moral rules. 
Moral rules can be violated. When rules are established to guide 
behavior towards certain standards, the need for such rules suggests that the 
possibility for alternative choices of actions exist. Just as moral rules prescribe 
certain actions, game rules do too. Thus, when an individual acts in a manner 
which deviates from the actions prescribed by a moral rule or game rule, he 
has violated or broken the rule regardless of his reasons for doing so. 
The violation of a moral rule requires justification. Because moral 
rules are vital to the continuance of a society, they exist. Institutional pro­
cedures are not used to promulgate, administer, and enforce moral rules; their 
use defends their existence. Thus, violating moral rules requires explanation 
and reasonable rationale. Game rules are essential to the existence of games, 
just as moral rules are essential to the existence of societies. However, in 
the case of game rules, institutional procedures exist for the promulgation, 
administration, and enforcement of the rules. Penalties for violations are well 
defined and allow no exceptions unless stipulated in the rules. Game rules 
can be changed or rescinded through defined channels, but until a game rule 
is changed or rescinded, it is an official rule. Violation of a game rule does 
not require an explanation and a reasonable rationale, as is the case with 
moral rules; rather, violation of a game rule results in the specified penalty. 
Moral rules are characterized by a lack of physical sanctions. No 
authorized system of enforcement or punishment exists for the breach of 
60 
moral rules. Rather, they are enforced by persuasion, appeals, smiles, and 
frowns. The sanctions are not haphazard and nebulous for game rules. A 
defined, authorized system of enforcement or punishment exists for the violation 
of game rules. Before a player breaks a game rule, he knows the conse­
quences of his action. Thus, the sanctioning of moral rules and game rules 
differs greatly. 
The essence of morality defies legislated enactment and enforcement. 
Thus, the rules which comprise the moral code of a society defy legislation 
also. Games, on the other hand, have a legal system and a moral aspect. 
The rules which constitute a game are a legislated system. The spirit of the 
game is the moral aspect. The sub-hypothesis that moral rules are to 
morality what game rules are to games is rejected as untenable. See Figure 1. 
In their respective provinces, game rules are not analogous to moral 
rules. To what then, if anything, are game rules analogous in real life 
situations? In Chapter IV, Hart's (19) concept of law was used as a model 
against which game rules were compared. Law, according to Hart's concept, 
is characterized principally by an authoritative mark, legislative enactment, and 
centralization of social pressure. 
Game rules have an authoritative mark, as laws have. Legal powers 
are conferred upon a person, board, commission, or body. This authorization 
gives the individual or group the rightful power to establish the rules which 
constitute the game and regulate the behavior of players. 
Game rules are legislated. In other words, the legislated rules are 
the official rules. The authorized individual or group formulates, writes down, 
announces, and enacts the rules of the game. This formal structure permits 
game rules to be altered, changed, or rescinded through appeal to the govern­
ing body. The same system is true of law. 
Game rules are enforced by a judge. A legal system must confer 
power on someone to judge whether or not everyone is acting in accordance 
with the established rules. In games, the authorized judge of players' actions 
is the official. 
Figure 1 
The Relationship of Moral Rules To Game Rules 
Real World Play Domain 
Morality + Games 
Moral rules are not 
exactly defined 
Game rules; are 1 
exactly defined i 
Moral rules contain 
ethical terms 
Moral rules are 
social in nature 
I Game rules are 
social in nature 
Game rules contain i 
action guiding words 1 
Moral rules are not 
legislated 
Game rules are 
legislated I 
Moral rules impose 
obligations 
Moral rules can be 
violated 
| Game rules can 
be violated 
Game rules demand 
obedience 1 
The violation of a moral 
rule requires justification 
The violation of a game rule ' 
does not require justification i 
Moral rules do not have . 
physical sanctions 
Game rules have 1 
physical sanctions i 
J 
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Game rules have physical sanctions. Penalties for violating the rules 
and procedures for imposing the penalties are well defined and organized. 
Hart called this defined, authorized system of enforcement and punishment the 
centralization of social pressure. Before violating a rule, an individual knows 
the penalty which will be imposed. 
The characteristics of law are applicable to game rules. It would 
seem that the official rules of a game are analogous to the laws of a culture. 
Morality and the spirit of the game are comparable phenomena. 
Games include an element identified as the spirit of the game which 
seems to be analogous to morality. If morality and the spirit of the game 
are analogous, there should be evidence in games of rules, other than legislated 
rules, which correspond to moral rules. In other words, since moral rules are 
societal codifications of morality, rules ought to exist in games which codify 
the spirit of the game. 
Black (4) suggested the possibility of the existence of uninferred rules 
that are unformulated. He concluded that there are implicit rules, meaning 
that such rules are not ". . . logically inferrible from explicitly formulated 
rules." (4:131) 
According to Black, in order to test the possibility of an uninferred 
or implicit rule existing, it is essential to have a set of explicit laws in 
effect so that comparison of behavior in observance of implicit law can be 
made with behavior in observance of explicit law. An explicit or official rule . 
exists in field hockey prohibiting advancement of the ball with the feet by any 
player except the goalkeeper. Generally, players in field hockey, when they 
know that they have advanced the ball with their feet, will not contact the 
ball again until an opposing player has contacted it. Such behavior is the 
observance of an implicit rule. If the implicit rule was not followed, other 
behaviors, such as the umpire's intervention, might result. The implicit rule 
is not found written in the field hockey rule book. Examination of the 
official rules leads to the conclusion that the rule must be implicit. In 
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golf, the official rules do not permit a player to seek or ask advice. However, 
if a player uses a four-iron from the fairway and the ball falls short of the 
green due to wind or to some other external condition, the player will show his 
three-iron to the next golfer. This gesture indicates to the next golfer that he 
should use the three-iron. This action results from the recognition of an im­
plicit rule. 
Black proposed some indicators which would suggest the existence of 
an implicit rule: 1) conformity of behavior towards the supposed rule, 2) 
admonitions not to behave against the rule, 3) a form of punishment for 
violating the rule. If everyone on the field hockey team behaved the same way 
when "advancing" occurred, if the players warned each other not to hit the ball 
because an unfair advantage would be gained, and if violation of this agreement 
resulted in frowns of disapproval, according to Black's criteria, an implicit rule 
would exist. The final test for checking if a rule fits the definition of an 
"implicit basic rule" would be, Black suggested, if the implicit rule was formu­
lated and offered to the individuals involved ". . . they would accept it as 
codifying their previous practice, and that after such acceptance their behavior 
would not be substantially changed." (4:131) 
Games are saturated with implicit rules. These rules suggest that a 
player should admit hitting the ball out-of-bounds, ought not hoard the ball, 
should not slide into bases with the spikes up. Other implicit game rules 
suggest that men should bat on their non-dominant side of home plate in 
mixed-sex softball games. A badminton player ought to call her carries. A 
baseball player should not fling the bat. A foul in basketball ought not to be 
with the intent of hurting another player. An opponent should be congratulated 
for an outstanding play. A runner should finish the race though far behind. 
These examples are a small sample of a large number of implicit rules found In 
games. 
Many game participants might agree with the author that the rules 
cited above are implicit rules. Some may not agree with the particular rules 
cited due to the unofficial nature of implicit rules. Other individuals may argue 
that such rules are only applicable in less institutionalized games, as when 
there is no official, or that the breaking of such rules is part of 
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good strategy. The lack of definiteness characteristic of implicit rules creates 
an air of ambiguity and vagueness. 
The existence of explicit or official game rules does not negate the 
existence of implicit rules. Implicit rules are distinguishable, as Black (4) 
pointed out, in light of explicit rules. Implicit game rules are the codifica­
tion of the spirit of the game. The official rules create artificial equality, 
as suggested by Caillois. (7) Implicit rules are based upon an understanding 
of the reason for official rules. Equality recognized in implicit rules is based 
upon respect of one's opponent. Recognition of the equality of one's op­
ponent is expected regardless of whether or not an explicit rule requiring it 
exists. Equality based upon respect of one's opponent is less artificial, more 
genuine, less externalized, more internalized than the equality created by 
explicit or official rules. 
Implicit game rules codify the spirit of the game. Just as moral rules 
codify morality. Moral rules have eight identifiable characteristics. Replacement 
of the words "moral rules" with the words "implicit game rules" yields the 
following: 1) Implicit game rules are not exactly defined; 2) implicit game 
rules contain ethical terms; 3) implicit game rules are social in nature; 4) 
implicit game rules are not legislated; 5) implicit game rules impose obligations; 
6) implicit game rules can be violated; 7) the violation of an implicit game 
rulo requires justification; 8) implicit game rules do not have physical sanctions. 
It can be concluded from the analysis of implicit rules that the identifiable 
characteristics of moral rules characterize implicit game rules as well. Moral 
rules and implicit game rules seem to be analogous phenomena within their 
respective provinces. See Figure 2. 
Since moral rules codify morality, just as implicit game rules codify the 
spirit of the game, morality and the spirit of the game would seem to be 
analogous phenomena within their respective realms. Instead of using institutional 
procedures for codifying and sanctioning moral rules and implicit game rules, more 
nebulous procedures, such as appeals to what is fair, smiles, and frowns are used. 
The essence of morality defies legislation in both real and game situations. The 
sub-hypothesis that morality and the spirit of the game are comparable phenomena 
is found tenable. 
Figure 2 
The Relationship of Moral Rules To Implicit Game Rules 
Real World 
Morality 
Play Domain 
Games 
Moral rules are not 
exactly defined 
Moral rules contain 
ethical terms 
Moral rules are 
social in nature 
Moral rules are not 
legislated 
Moral rules impose 
obligations 
Moral rules can 
be violated 
The violation of a 
moral rule requires 
justification 
Moral rules do not 
have physical 
sanctions 
Implicit game rules are 
not exactly defined 
Implicit game rules 
contain ethical terms 
Implicit game rules 
| are social in nature 
Implicit game rules 
are not legislated 
Implicit game rules 
| impose obligations 
Implicit game rules 
| can be violated 
The violation of an 
| implicit game rule 
requires justification 
Implicit game rules 
do not have 
physical sanctions 
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Summary. 
Comparison of the theoretical structure of moral rules and game rules 
led to the support and acceptance of the sub-hypothesis that a concept exists 
which is basic to both moral rules and game rules. However, a comparison 
of the identifiable characteristics of moral rules and game rules led to the 
rejection of the sub-hypothesis that moral rules are to morality what game 
rules are to games. 
Evidence suggested a relationship between morality and the spirit of 
the game. Analysis of this relationship led to the support and acceptance of 
the sub-hypothesis that morality and the spirit of the game are comparable 
phenomena. As a result of the philosophical analysis, the major hypothesis 
that moral rules and game rules are philosophically congruent within their 
respective provinces is rejected as untenable. 
Figure 3 
The Relationship of Analogous Elements 
Within The Real World And 
The Play Domain 
CULTURE 4 
SOCIETAL MEMBERS 4 
LAW ^ 
MORALITY 4 
MORAL RULES 4r 
^ GAME 
— PLAYERS 
— GAME RULES 
— SPIRIT 
OF THE GAME 
— ^ IMPLICIT 
GAME RULES 
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CHAPTER VII 
PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Hypothesis. 
Games can be used to teach morality. 
Sub-hypotheses. 
1. Morality can be taught. 
2. The spirit of the game is the vehicle through which games can 
be used to teach morality. 
Introduction. 
Traditionally, moral rules and rules of conduct were established through 
a process of reflection by many generations on the rightness and wrongness of 
certain patterns of behaving. Mead (28) has suggested that this process is no 
longer applicable to cultures which are characterized by rapid social change. 
The traditional sources of rules are themselves changing and must continue to 
change in order to keep abreast with technological changes; for example, the 
creation of life in vitro, the decreased need for physical strength in performing 
work tasks, and genetic control til are concepts which strain traditional change 
agents. (11, 35, 54) However, in spite of severe cultural mutation, evidence 
does not support the idea that moral rules and rules of conduct are no 
longer necessary in complex, rapidly changing cultures. The pattern seems to 
be, as Hart (19) suggested, that as cultures increase in complexity and as 
stability decreases, the need is increased for formal, official rules. Moral rules 
are not official, legislated rules; however, if the need for official rules increases 
in complex cultures, it is apparent that the need for knowledge and under­
standing of the concept of morality and societal codifications of that concept 
must be manifest. Regardless of whether or not the prefigurative culture, as 
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described by Mead (28), becomes reality, it is obvious that societies need to 
find new vehicles for teaching morality in addition to the ones they already 
have. 
Games may be one such vehicle, for games reflect culture, as 
established in Chapter IV. Thus, technological changes within culture are re­
flected in games. For example, as the role of women is changing in society, 
it is reflected in games, as evidenced by the inclusion of women on pre­
viously all-male teams, and the opportunity for women to publicly participate 
in what traditionally have been regarded as all-male sports. Since games include 
moral principles which seem to be related to a society's moral code, games 
might be studied in relation to their moral flavor, as well as in relation to 
their social directive. 
Morality can be taught. 
It was established in Chapter II that there are levels of moral judgment. 
The emergent pattern of moral judgment development is that individuals progress 
from stage to stage; however, an individual can seldom comprehend judgments 
which are more than one stage higher than his own. Individuals need to be 
taught the conventional moral code to which the larger part of the society 
subscribes, but the moral experiences need to be sufficiently open-ended so that 
individuals learn to understand the reasons for the moral code. Individuals are 
taught certain patterns, such as right and wrong, good and bad, fair and unfair, 
before they understand the reasons for those patterns and the rules pertaining 
to them. (13, 64) Peters (64) ceiled this proditamen!" the paradox of moral 
education. The predicament, according to Peters, concerns the question of how 
to teach individuals sound moral habits while not stultifying the development 
of a rational moral code. 
Particularly in cultures characterized by rapid social change, it would 
seem feasible to keep the teaching of morality as general and open as possible. 
(2, 64) In other words, the creation of new and different circumstances 
demands reflection, not blind adherence to rules, when making moral decisions. 
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As Peters (64) suggested, it requires intelligence and social sophistication to act 
on a rule rather than in accordance with a rule. To act on a rule sug­
gests that a number of different actions fall under an abstract rule. Moral 
rules are action-guidelines, not action-mandates which have no exceptions. They 
are implicitly general and should be taught in that light. 
Kohlberg suggested that the teaching of moral concepts ". . . is the 
asking of questions and the pointing of the way, not the giving of answers." 
(82:3) Kohlberg has experimented with and established procedures for teaching 
the nature of morality or the nature of virtue, as he called it. Initially, a 
student is exposed to moral conflict situations for which his moral concepts 
have no adequate solution. Then, the student is exposed to different points 
of view about solutions to these situations. When conflict occurs within the 
student, he tends to become dissatisfied with the rules or principles upon which 
he based his judgment and chooses to be motivated at a higher level of 
judgment. For example, students at stage two who are motivated to fulfill 
quasi-physical needs when faced with a moral dilemma would be exposed to 
disagreements and arguments of students at stage three who are motivated by 
a concern for social approval. When new moral conflict situations were posed, 
stage three students would face stage four arguments oriented toward under­
standing and maintaining the social order. The teacher, Kohlberg suggested, 
would support and clarify the higher-level judgments. 
An analysis of the pertinent literature seems to indicate that morality 
can be taught. However, the ways of best accomplishing such a complex 
task are not established, although Kohlberg has advanced some procedures which 
could serve as a guide. The sub-hypothesis that morality can be taught is 
found tenable. 
The spirit of the game is the vehicle through which games can be used to 
teach morality. 
Lucas (86), a philosopher, has argued that games are not amenable to 
teaching real world situations. He reasoned that games have fewer relevant 
features than serious situations have. With less relevant features, the same 
game can be played at different times and still resemble previous games. Real 
world situations with more factors affecting them are less likely to resemble 
previous situations, he argued. 
The rules of the game do set limits and possibly exclude some of the 
factors which might influence real life situations. However, the exclusion of 
some factors as not applicable to games may be an advantage for the use of 
games as a teaching vehicle. If some factors are excluded from game situations 
as irrelevant, it is possible that these same factors fog the discernment of the 
relevant features in real world situations. Since games contain a moral aspect 
called the spirit of the game and a legal aspect called game rules against which 
implicit game rules can be tested, the features which are germane to the teach­
ing of morality seem to exist in games. Games as microcosms of the culture 
within which they exist have a sufficient number of features which are applicable 
to real world situations to warrant their utilization as agents of transition. The 
study of games with emphasis upon game spirit might be used for teaching real 
life values and behaviors and might bring the process of rational choice into play. 
Piaget (33) suggested that mere experiences are not enough to guarantee 
the learning of moral values and concepts, the experiences must be moral in 
nature. If this suggestion is related to games, merely playing a game does not 
guarantee the learning of moral values. But, when playing experiences include 
knowledge of the moral aspects contained in games and decision-making regarding 
the use of such knowledge, it is reasonable to assume that the learning of 
moral values and concepts might be realized in game situations. 
The spirit of the game encompasses the concepts of right and wrong, 
fair and unfair, just as morality does. However, teachers need to emphasize 
the morally relevant aspects in games. The congruency of game rules to law, 
of the spirit of the game to morality, and of implicit game rules to moral 
rules should be established, discussed, and understood. It must then be tested 
by experience. 
The teacher should set up hypothetical game situations which require 
decision-making based upon an understanding of morality. Haskins and Hartman 
(20, 21) have provided some hypothetical game situations. They developed 
72 
two cats of twenty incidents which might occur in 'various sports and provided 
five alternative actions for each situation. For example, 
A baseball player trapped a fly ball between the ground and his 
glove in what appeared to be a spectacular catch. Such action is 
called "Trapping" and is against the rules. The player wasn't sure 
the umpire saw him. 
a. The player should have immediately confessed that he illegally 
trapped the ball. 
b. The player should wait for the umpire's decision and abide by it. 
c. If the umpire ruled his catch illegal, he should disagree on the 
grounds that he felt that the umpire could not see the play. 
d. If the umpire asks him if he trapped the ball he should say he 
did. 
e. If the umpire asks him, he should say he did not trap the ball. 
(21:8) 
Such a hypothetical situation could provide the springboard for decision­
making with regard to morality. Perhaps hypothetical game situations should 
be presented without a list of choices. Individuals would be encouraged to 
identify, clarify, and justify their moral values and judgments. The teacher 
would be prepared to ask questions, to discuss alternatives, to lend insights, 
and to elucidate societal postures, without imposing personal values upon the 
students. 
Real game situations could then be used for moral reflection. How 
does the excitement of play and winning affect moral judgments? Is it "fair" 
to consider morality in the fever of play? Is stated behavior consistent with 
playing behavior? Do moral considerations become more or less important 
when there are officials? What happens to the tenor of play when one team 
deliberately breaks implicit rules for its advantage? When is strategy cheating? 
The understanding of what constitutes right and wrong for interacting 
individuals in societies characterized by greater complexity and by ever-increasing 
change becomes increasingly important. The spirit of the game with its ac­
companying implicit rules is the vehicle through which games can be used to 
teach morality. 
Usually, physical education teachers and coaches have waited for a 
"teachable moment" to discuss moral judgments; that is, they have waited until 
a situation presented itself by chance. If the sub-hypothesis that the spirit of 
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the game is a teaching vehicle for morality is to be realistically tenable, it 
is strikingly apparent that moral concepts and values must be taught rather 
than caught. Only as there is the actual realization of such a concept 
can the validity of the abstraction be found tenable. 
Summary. 
Examination of the pertinent literature led to the support and ac­
ceptance of the sub-hypothesis that morality can be taught. Logical implica­
tions as to how games might be used to teach morality were drawn. The 
sub-hypothesis that the spirit of the game is the vehicle through which games 
can be used to teach morality was supported and intellectually accepted. In 
light of the support of the sub-hypotheses, the major hypothesis that games 
can be used to teach morality was found tenable. The practicality of such 
a hypothesis rests upon the commitment to teach morality by those who are 
responsible for the future. Physical educators have an important place in such 
a scheme. 
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